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PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN THE PUBLIC 
SPHERE— 
TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF 
RESIDENTIAL MONITORING OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
Omer Kimhi* 
Private enforcement litigation, namely class and derivative actions, are 
powerful tools in the commercial domain. By empowering a representative-
plaintiff to litigate in the name of a harmed dispersed group, these procedures 
solve collective action problems, and improve shareholder and consumer moni-
toring. The article explores the potential of using such litigation tools also in the 
local public sphere. It examines local residents’ possibility to sue on behalf of a 
dispersed group of taxpayers (“taxpayer suits”) and to receive remedy for harms 
the group (as a whole) suffers. 
The article provides the most extensive analysis of such local taxpayer suits 
to date. We show that although taxpayer suits are legally available in almost all 
states, they are, by and large, a dead letter. As opposed to their commercial 
equivalents, and despite their considerable potential importance, taxpayer-
plaintiffs scarcely use them; courts constrain them and the legal literature mostly 
ignores them. We argue that the implementation of several relatively simple re-
forms can increase the use of this forgotten legal tool—thereby improving the 
monitoring on local officials, decreasing corruption, and empowering local resi-
dents. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1861, Simeon Draper, a senior city official, was involved in the sale of 
real-estate property belonging to the city of New York.1 Mr. Draper had a per-
sonal interest in the deal, but despite the conflict of interests, no city or state 
official barred his involvement. He participated in the negotiations, and was 
very much influential in procuring the conveyance.2 Due to the city and state’s 
inaction with respect to Draper’s involvement in the deal, Roosevelt, a city tax-
payer, turned to the courts.3 He argued that under the city’s ordinance Mr. 
Draper was prohibited from taking part in the transaction, and requested the 
court to void the deal.4 The court agreed with Roosevelt on the merits, but re-
fused to grant his request.5 The court explained that although the city statute 
was violated, the plaintiff, as a taxpayer, had no rights “growing out of the vio-
lation.”6 The plaintiff was not part of the transaction, and he could show no 
special pecuniary interests that enabled him to “vindicate the law.”7 A few 
years later, referring to the situation in Roosevelt, the New York court ex-
plained the severity of the taxpayers’ weakness as follows: 
                                                        
1  Roosevelt v. Draper, 23 N.Y. 318, 319 (1861). 
2  Id. 
3  Id. 
4  Id. at 322–23. 
5  Id. at 326. 
6  Id. at 330. 
7  Id. 
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Municipal corporations had become to an alarming extent the prey of the spoiler, 
and the tax-payer, upon whom the loss fell and the burden of the wrong-doing 
ultimately rested, was remediless . . . This utter helplessness of the tax-payer, 
and the fact that he was entirely at the mercy of officials who might prove un-
worthy of and criminally unfaithful to their trust, became an evil calling loudly 
for correction.8 
As a response to the plight of taxpayers since the mid-19th century, courts 
and legislatures have developed a legal tool called: taxpayer suits.9 A taxpayer 
suit is a type of class or derivative action in the public sphere.10 Similar to the 
way class or derivative actions empower a representative-plaintiff to litigate in 
the name of consumers or shareholders, a taxpayer suit empowers a representa-
tive-plaintiff to litigate in the name of a group of taxpayers.11 A local action in-
jures a dispersed unorganized group of taxpayers (the damages suffered by 
each individual taxpayer being negligible), and the taxpayer suit procedure en-
ables a representative plaintiff to seek remedy for the harm inflicted on the 
group as a whole.12 The taxpayer suit is designed to facilitate the private en-
forcement of taxpayers’ collective rights, and thus to relieve them, at least in 
theory, from the “mercy of officials who might prove unworthy.”13 The proce-
dure can be used when local officials engage in self-dealing or receive exces-
sive compensation,14 when local decisions are taken without proper authority,15 
when the locality violates a group of taxpayers’ rights,16 or when the local gov-
ernment wastes public funds by conferring an unlawful benefit to a third par-
ty.17 
As can be learned from the commercial sphere, the potential of private en-
forcement to improve monitoring on local governments can be significant.18 
Just as class and derivative actions incentivize shareholders and consumers—or, 
more precisely their lawyers—to monitor commercial corporations, taxpayer 
actions can incentivize taxpayers, or their lawyers, to monitor municipal corpo-
                                                        
8  Ayers v. Lawrence, 59 N.Y. 192, 195–96 (1874). 
9  The procedure is also known as a “watchdog suit.” See, e.g., Charles W. Goldner, Jr., State 
and Local Government Fiscal Responsibility: An Integrated Approach, 26 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 925, 939–40 (1991). 
10  74 AM. JUR. 2D Taxpayers’ Actions § 4 (2017). 
11  18 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 52:2 (3d ed. 2017). 
12  Id. 
13  Ayers, 59 N.Y. at 195. 
14  See, e.g., Davis v. State ex rel. Hood, 198 So. 3d 367, 367 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). 
15  See, e.g., Sullins v. Cent. Ark. Water, 454 S.W.3d 727, 727 (Ark. 2015); Westbrook v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 524 N.E.2d 485, 485–86 (Ohio 1988); State ex rel. Fent v. State 
ex rel. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 66 P.3d 432, 433 (Okla. 2003). 
16  See, e.g., Comps, Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 703 N.Y.S.2d 225, 225–26 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2000). 
17  See, e.g., Square Parking Systems, Inc. v. Jersey City Business Adm’r, 449 A.2d 559, 559 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982); City of Wichita Falls v. Cooper, 170 S.W.2d 777, 778 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943). 
18  Cf. Max Schanzenbach & Nadav Shoked, Reclaiming Fiduciary Law for the City, 70 
STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
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rations. The actions can create an army of private attorney generals that initiate 
legal proceedings when local officials’ conduct seems illegal or corrupt, and the 
litigation may discipline the officials, deter corruption, and improve local deci-
sion-making processes—all at very little cost.19 
But despite the potential of taxpayer suits to serve as a monitoring tool on 
local governments, and although the procedure is legally available in almost all 
states, today it is, by and large, a dead letter. Taxpayer-plaintiffs scarcely use 
this procedure; courts, despite their rhetoric, constrain its use, and the legal lit-
erature mostly ignores it. The legal tool developed to empower taxpayers vis-à-
vis their local officials is all but forgotten, leaving local residents not much bet-
ter than they were when the Roosevelt case was decided in 1861.20 In this arti-
cle, we aim to shed light on this woefully, under-explored procedure. We pro-
vide an extensive examination of local-taxpayer suits in various states (to the 
best of our knowledge, the first of its kind), and analyze them from both posi-
tive and normative perspectives. 
To examine the use of local-taxpayer suits, we conducted a case-law sur-
vey of fourteen states. We looked at how often taxpayer suits were utilized by 
taxpayers, and how the suits were received by different courts. The data pre-
sented in the article shows that, despite the potential benefits of this proce-
dure—and, as opposed to the multitude of class—and derivative actions—local 
taxpayer suits are rarely used. Since 1990, most states have seen less than fifty 
taxpayer actions (i.e., less than two taxpayer actions per year on average); Only 
two states (Ohio and California) saw more than 150 taxpayer actions (188 in 
California, and 155 in Ohio).21 Overall, in the states examined, there were ap-
proximately 700 local-taxpayer cases in twenty-six years—i.e., on average, on-
ly 4 percent of the general purpose local governments dealt with even one tax-
payer suit over the last quarter century.22 Even if we compare taxpayer suits to 
a small subset of all class-action suits, i.e. federal securities class actions, the 
number of taxpayer suits is very small. The average number of local-taxpayer 
suits filed each year in all the states we examined (twenty-seven suits) is a sev-
enth of the average number of securities class actions filed each year (188 
suits)—even though the number of general purpose local governments in these 
states is almost four times the number of listed companies.23 
The reasons for the scarcity of taxpayer suits, we maintain, can be divided 
into two broad categories: objective reasons and legal reasons.24 The objective 
reasons are related to the information available to potential plaintiffs. As op-
posed to commercial corporations, local authorities do not disclose detailed in-
                                                        
19  See discussion infra Section II.B and accompanying notes. 
20  See discussion infra Section III.A and accompanying notes. 
21  See discussion infra Section III.A and accompanying notes. 
22  See discussion infra Section III.A and accompanying notes. 
23  See discussion infra Section III.A and accompanying notes. 
24  See discussion infra Section III.C and accompanying notes. 
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formation about their operations,25 and there are no share prices that reflect ad-
verse events or quantify potential damages. The lack of information renders the 
initiation of litigation more difficult, and, as a result, fewer actions are filed.26 
These objective reasons, albeit important, are supplemented by legal reasons. 
Our examination reveals that although courts express their support for the tax-
payer suits procedure, in practice they are somewhat reluctant.27 Some courts 
require plaintiffs to meet certain standing requirements (even though these re-
quirements are not mandated by statute); some courts narrowly interpret the 
statutes that provide for taxpayer suits, and perhaps most importantly, nearly all 
courts rarely award attorney’s fees to representative-plaintiffs (even when they 
have statutory authority to do so).28 Thus, plaintiffs have to bear the full costs 
of the litigation, but since they enjoy only a small portion of the benefits, they 
have little interest to initiate proceedings. 
These courts’ attitudes raise a normative question—should the legal system 
encourage taxpayer suits, or perhaps allowing only a few taxpayer suits is so-
cially preferable? To answer this question, the article addresses three arguments 
raised against the extensive use of taxpayer suits—the separation of powers 
doctrine, the flood of litigation concern, and the circularity argument.29 We ex-
amine each of these arguments, but argue they do not justify the courts’ atti-
tudes. Although these arguments raise valid criticisms, they do not require a 
narrow interpretation of judicial review in taxpayer suits. On the contrary, we 
maintain that, if properly administered, taxpayer suits can benefit residents by 
enhancing the monitoring of local officials, supporting weak groups in the lo-
cality, and reducing the power of special-interest groups. 
In order to strengthen judicial review, therefore, we suggest several re-
forms.30 First, contrary to the American rule, we argue that courts in taxpayer 
suits should award attorneys’ fees to winning plaintiffs. The article shows that 
the mechanism of private enforcement relies on the award of attorneys’ fees 
because it is the lawyers who conduct the monitoring and push for litigation. 
The courts’ current approaches marginalize the lawyers’ role, thus rendering 
the taxpayer procedure inefficient.31 Second, we propose that courts adopt a 
corporate-like standard of judicial review also when scrutinizing municipal 
corporations. Corporate courts, especially in Delaware, are cautious when re-
viewing corporate officers’ discretion, but they do intervene when officers be-
have unlawfully, without good faith, or when the decision-making process is 
                                                        
25  Darien Shanske, The Feds Are Already Here: The Federal Role in Municipal Debt Fi-
nance, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 795, 802–03 (2014); Theresa A. Gabaldon, Financial 
Federalism and the Short, Happy Life of Municipal Securities Regulation, 34 J. CORP. L. 
739, 742–53 (2009). 
26  See discussion infra Section III.C. 
27  See discussion infra Section III.B and accompanying notes. 
28  See discussion infra Section III.B and accompanying notes. 
29  See discussion infra Part IV. 
30  See discussion infra Section IV.D. 
31  See discussion infra Section III.C. 
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flawed.32 This is the type of judicial review we call for in taxpayer actions as 
well. Instead of shying away from judicial review altogether (as most courts 
do) or, conversely, instead of replacing the officials’ discretion with their own, 
courts should take the middle ground. They should examine whether the proce-
dure that led to the decision (the decision-making process) is proper, and, of 
course, whether the decision itself is legal, and intervene only to the extent it is 
not. 
The article, we believe, makes several contributions to the existing litera-
ture. First, when exploring the monitoring of local governments, the literature 
so far has focused on three possible monitors: the locality’s residents, the local-
ity’s creditors, and the state.33 Little attention has been paid to the possibility of 
private monitoring through taxpayer litigation. Although the option of local 
taxpayer suits is available in most states (and even on the federal level), and 
although private enforcement is extremely successful in the commercial sphere, 
the legal literature largely overlooked it. In the article, we fill this gap. We do 
not claim that taxpayer suits should replace existing monitors, but we do argue 
that it can improve and empower local monitoring. Second, with respect to the 
taxpayer suits procedure itself, the literature so far has mostly concentrated on 
the Supreme Court’s rejection of federal and state taxpayer suits, and pointed 
out that the state system is more receptive to this type of procedure.34 In the ar-
ticle, however, we show that, even in state courts, taxpayer suits, or at least lo-
cal-taxpayer suits, are neither prevalent nor very well received. This conclusion 
is based on novel data we gathered from hundreds of state courts’ decisions 
(including information on parties, causes of action, remedies sought, ac-
ceptance rates, and the allocation of attorney’s fees). Third, we use the empiri-
cal analysis to draw policy recommendations. We argue that the taxpayer pro-
cedure introduces the private lawyering sector as an additional monitoring 
agent that can help decrease the residents’ collective-action problems. The re-
forms we suggest encourage the use of this tool by the private-lawyering sector 
that in turn enhances the judicial review on local governments and local offi-
cials. 
                                                        
32  Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. 
Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. Rev. 675, 675 (2002); Jamie L. 
Kastler, The Problem with Waste: Delaware’s Lenient Treatment of Waste Claims at the 
Demand Stage of Derivative Litigation, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1899, 1902–03 (2011). 
33  Charles K. Coe, Preventing Local Government Fiscal Crises: Emerging Best Practices, 
68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 759, 759 (2008); Clayton P. Gillette, Can Public Debt Enhance De-
mocracy?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937, 937 (2008); Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal 
Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 656 (2008); Richard C. 
Schragger, Citizens Versus Bondholders, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 789 (2012). 
34  Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing 
Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 773–75 (2003); Edward A. Zelinsky, Putting State Courts in 
the Constitutional Driver’s Seat: State Taxpayer Standing After Cuno and Winn, 40 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 3 (2012). 
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The article then proceeds as follows: In the first part of this article, follow-
ing this introduction, we discuss local monitoring in general. We describe the 
various monitors, and show that local monitoring is lacking. In the second part, 
we look at private enforcement mechanisms, and show how they can contribute 
to local monitoring. The third part analyzes the data on local taxpayer suits. In 
the fourth part, we conduct a normative analysis and suggest possible reforms. 
The fifth part of the article concludes. 
I. LOCAL GOVERNMENT MONITORING 
Much like commercial corporations, municipal corporations suffer from 
agency problems.35 As public choice theory indicates, local officials can also be 
viewed as a homines economici, whose aim is to increase their political power 
and control, rather than altruistically serve the public.36 Local officials may 
spend public funds on unnecessary, even extravagant, infrastructure, succumb 
to the demands of interest groups in order to gain their political support, and are 
liable to overspend the local budget on salaries or pensions to avoid conflicts 
with municipal employees.37 
Due to the perils of these agency problems—and, again, not unlike com-
mercial corporations—local officials are monitored by several agents.38 Just as 
corporate officers are monitored by the corporation’s shareholders and credi-
tors, local officials are monitored by the local residents, the locality’s creditors, 
and the state that the municipality is located.39 In this part, we examine the effi-
ciency of this monitoring. We show that although each of these monitoring par-
ties serves an important role, the monitoring of local officials and local activi-
ties can be lacking. Residents and creditors suffer from collective-action 
problems, and the state suffers from political biases. 
                                                        
35  An agency problem occurs when the welfare of one party (the “principal”) depends on 
actions taken by another (the “agent”). The agent may not act in the best interests of the 
principal, but rather to maximize his own welfare. See John Armour et al., Agency Problems, 
Legal Strategies and Enforcement 2 (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ. and 
Bus., Paper No. 644, 2009), http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1433&context= 
harvard_olin [https://perma.cc/J4ZZ-UHG4]. For a description of agency problems in the 
commercial-corporate context, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 
309 (1976). 
36  Robert J. Barro, The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, 14 PUB. CHOICE 19, 26–
31 (1973); Jean Tirole, The Internal Organization of Government, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 
1, 1–2 (1994). 
37  Daniel A. Farber, Democracy and Disgust: Reflections on Public Choice, 65 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 161, 161 (1989); Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public 
Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 962–64 (1991). 
38  Kimhi, supra note 33, at 647–55. 
39  Id. 
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A. The Residents 
At first glance, residents appear to be the most obvious and potent monitors 
of local policies. They have a clear interest in monitoring because they live in 
the locality and the quality of their lives is influenced by the way the locality is 
managed. They also have the tools to influence because they vote in the local 
elections and participate in the Tieboutian market for residence (they can exit 
the locality).40 
A closer look at the residents as monitoring agents, however, reveals some 
inherent difficulties. The residents suffer from collective-action problems.41 
Although the monitoring efforts can benefit the residents as a group, each indi-
vidual resident has little incentive to invest in it. Monitoring not only consumes 
time and resources, but its benefits are spread among all the local residents—
even those who do not share its costs. Thus, each resident has an interest in let-
ting others invest in the monitoring for him, while he stays idle and “free 
ride[s].”42 Since many residents are rationally indifferent, monitoring is under-
provided, to the detriment of the community as a whole.43 
The existence of special interest groups aggravates the residents’ monitor-
ing ability even further.44 Interest groups are discrete, well-organized groups in 
the community that pursue a common goal.45 By definition, an interest group 
does not seek to maximize the benefit of the locality, but rather to promote the 
narrow interests shared by the group’s members.46 The problem (or advantage) 
of interest groups is that they are more efficient in pursuing their goals than the 
large, dispersed public.47 Due to their size, interest groups are better able to 
force their members to take part in the pursuit of the groups’ goals, and since 
they have fewer members (when compared to the large, dispersed public), the 
members receive a larger portion of the benefits attained by the group.48 
                                                        
40  Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and Financially Stressed Municipalities, 39 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 639, 658 (2012). 
41  See id. at 658–59; Schragger, supra note 33, at 790. 
42  Gillette, supra note 40, at 659. 
43  As Clayton Gillette points out, monitoring is a type of public good. See Gillette, supra 
note 33, at 955. In economics, public good is defined as having two characteristics: non-
rivalry and non-excludability. A good is non-rivalrous when its consumption by one individ-
ual does not reduce the amount of the good available to other potential consumers. A good is 
non-excludable when it cannot be excluded from those who did not share the costs of its 
production. See RONALD C. FISHER, STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE 41 (2d. ed. 1996). 
Since monitoring is both non-rivalrous and non-excludable, it is likely to be under-provided 
under regular market conditions. 
44  Gillette, supra note 40, at 659. 
45  MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 6, 9–16 (2d ed. 1971). 
46  Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 
101 YALE L.J. 31, 35–41 (1991). 
47  OLSON, supra note 45, at 7. 
48  Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 211–
13 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
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Whereas unorganized residents are often rationally indifferent, interest 
groups—through lobbying, contributions or political support—are able to influ-
ence local officials. Policy is skewed in their direction, and the large, dispersed 
public can do little to prevent this outcome.49 
Therefore, leaving the monitoring to the residents, can lead to inefficient 
outcomes. It can disproportionally benefit interest groups, at the expense of the 
general public. 
B. The Creditors 
Due to the residents’ collective action problems, some scholars, most nota-
bly Clayton Gillette, have seen the locality’s creditors as a possible substitute.50 
A locality’s creditors, similar to the creditors of a commercial corporation, have 
an interest in monitoring their debtor. If the locality is poorly managed, or if it 
overspends its financial resources, the creditors are at risk of financial loss. 
Although the creditors do not have the residents’ voting powers, they can exert 
influence on local officials through alternative tools.51 Credit agreements may 
contain covenants that compel (or prevent) localities from taking certain ac-
tions,52 and, in any event, the creditors control the extension of credit. If a local-
ity takes a confrontational approach or ignores the creditors’ demands, the cred-
itors may raise interest rates or cease to extend them credit altogether.53 
The creditors’ monitoring, however, also entails difficulties. The primary 
problem, perhaps the main problem, is the scope of the creditors’ monitoring. 
As opposed to the residents, who live, educate their children, and own real-
estate in a locality, the creditors have a relatively narrow interest in that locali-
ty—the repayment of the credit they extend. From the creditors’ point of view, 
city officials can act self-interestedly and implement whatever policy they 
wish, as long as the city has sufficient resources to pay them back.54 They do 
not care about the level of services the city provides or the burden of taxes im-
posed on the residents. This is especially true when a certain action or policy 
harms the residents, but improves the local fiscal health. A local action may be 
dishonest, even illegal, but the creditors will have little incentive to prevent it, 
if the action decreases the chances of local insolvency. Creditors, for example, 
do not monitor whether the city levies taxes contrary to the law, or whether the 
mayor grants illegitimate favors to certain businesses.55 
                                                                                                                                 
SCI. 3, 10–13 (1971); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 
339, 341–42 (1988). 
49  See Elhauge, supra note 46, at 35–41; see also Gillette, supra note 40, at 659–64. 
50  Gillette, supra note 33, at 966; Gillette, supra note 40, at 664. 
51  Kimhi, supra note 33, at 661. 
52  Gillette, supra note 33, at 952. 
53  Kimhi, supra note 33, at 661. 
54  Gillette, supra note 40, at 667. 
55  Id. at 666–70. 
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A second problem with creditors’ monitoring concerns their ability to af-
fect local policies when they discover a malfunction. Although, as mentioned, 
creditors can pressure local officials, this may be insufficient. In many cases, 
officials are perfectly aware that a certain action or decision they take is objec-
tionable to creditors, but take it anyway, either because they gain a personal 
benefit from it, or because they are bound by political circumstances or interest 
group pressures.56 In these cases, the creditors’ pressures do little good. Wheth-
er interest rates are raised, or even if credit is denied, local officials may be set 
in their ways.57 
C. The State 
The state is a third monitoring agent that can potentially solve these prob-
lems.58 According to local-government law, local governments are creatures of 
the state. States regulate local governments in their jurisdiction, both in terms 
of operations and finances.59 They set local debt and tax limitations, establish 
operational guidelines, and can establish environmental controls.60 The state’s 
monitoring activities are an extension of its regulatory capabilities. In case the 
local officials ignore the state’s guidelines, the latter can sanction the disobey-
ing locality or its local officials personally. In this respect, the state’s monitor-
ing is much more efficient than that of the residents or creditors. The state does 
not suffer from collective action problems, and it possesses the political powers 
and legal authority to influence local policies.61 
However, the state’s monitoring also has drawbacks. First, the state’s mon-
itoring involves significant costs. For the monitoring to be conducted effective-
ly, the state needs to create a monitoring body with an adequate professional 
and administrative staff.62 States are not necessarily willing to invest the funds 
needed for such a professional body, often preferring to downgrade the moni-
                                                        
56  Kimhi, supra note 33, at 662–63. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. at 664; Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers of Financially 
Failed Cities, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1384–85 (2014). 
59  Local government law gives states plenary powers over local governments. Unless other-
wise asserted in the state’s constitution, the state has the requisite authority to force local 
governments to implement policies or take actions, whereas local governments have only 
those powers delegated to them by the state. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 
178–79 (1907); 1 SANDRA M. STEVENSON & WENDY VAN WIE, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW § 13.01 (2d ed. 2017); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The 
Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (1990); Gerald E. Frug, The 
City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1062–65 (1980). 
60  Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 
YALE J. ON REG. 351, 385–91 (2010). 
61  Id. at 386. 
62  The Local Government Commission in North Carolina, for example, employs about 35 
associates and additional administrative staff, and its budget is more than $2.5 million dol-
lars. See Coe, supra note 33, at 45. 
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toring level.63 This problem is particularly acute, since the state and its political 
officials do not always obtain political benefits from monitoring. Monitoring 
may improve the welfare of local residents or reduce the price of local debt,64 
but these benefits are long-term and hardly attributed to the state.65 In the short 
term, especially when no locality is on the brink of financial calamity, monitor-
ing may not bring state officials much political support.66 
In addition, when states engage in monitoring, there is a danger that the 
monitoring will be politically oriented. State and local politics are, in many 
ways, intertwined,67 and the state legislature and executive are politically moti-
vated in the way they deal with localities.68 These political motivations may be 
related to the local officials’ party affiliation (and state officials’ partisanship), 
but they may also be linked to the locality’s geographical attributes—city or 
suburb, urban or rural, etc.69 When a mayor and his governor are political ri-
vals, or when the mayor does not have sufficient political influence in the 
state’s corridors, the state’s attitude towards the locality may be negative, and 
the monitoring can become politically-motivated instead of economically-
driven.70 Dorothy Brown’s account of Bridgeport’s municipal bankruptcy filing 
is a good example.71 Per Brown, when monitoring Bridgeport’s financial af-
fairs, “State officials were motivated by their own political interests and not the 
best interests of Bridgeport’s citizens.”72 The political rivalry between the 
                                                        
63  Omer Kimhi, Chronicle of a Local Crisis Foretold–Lessons from Israel, 39 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 679, 692–94 (2012). 
64  When the state closely monitors local governments’ finances, it shows a commitment to 
the prevention of local crises. This reduces the risk of extending credit to all local govern-
ments in the state, hence reducing the interest rates localities are charged. North Carolina is a 
good example. Due to its Local Government Commission’s exceptional work, credit rating 
agencies have upgraded the credit rating of North Carolina’s local debt, lowering municipali-
ties’ interest rates. See Stephen C. Fehr, North Carolina Agency Is Local Government Life-
line, PEW CHARITABLE TR.: STATELINE (June 06, 2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/resear 
ch-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2012/06/06/north-carolina-agency-is-local-government-life 
line [https://perma.cc/DB8Q-QCKK]. 
65  Kimhi, supra note 63, at 696–704. 
66  State voters (the local residents) do not always appreciate the state’s monitoring, and state 
politicians do not derive political benefits from the funds the state invested in monitoring. It 
is politically convenient, therefore, to cut expenditures on local monitoring in favor of other 
state activities that are more politically beneficial. 
67  Nancy Burns & Gerald Gamm, Creatures of the State: State Politics and Local Govern-
ment, 1871–1921, 33 URB. AFF. REV. 59, 89 (1997). 
68  Id. at 59 (“According to various accounts, this state-level interference has rarely been be-
nign.”). 
69  Nancy Burns et al., Urban Politics in the State Arena, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1, 1 
(2009). 
70  Kimhi, supra note 63, at 704–10. 
71  Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as 
a Case Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 625, 625 (1995). 
72  Id. at 634. 
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mayor and the state, argues Brown, much more than economic necessity, drove 
the city to bankruptcy.73 
This is not to say that monitoring by the state, creditors, or residents is su-
perfluous or redundant. On the contrary, their actions are important, as each of 
these agents monitor a different aspect of the city’s affairs. The analysis, how-
ever, does indicate that the monitoring may be lacking. Due to the problems 
discussed, city officials’ actions may not be sufficiently supervised, resulting in 
harm to city residents. This is partly why so many cities experienced financial 
distress and provided poor services to their residents in the last few years. Ad-
ditional monitoring tools may be in order. 
II. TAXPAYER SUITS 
A possible tool to improve the monitoring is taxpayer suits. Taxpayer suits 
are legal proceedings brought by an individual taxpayer as a representative of a 
class of taxpayers.74 The plaintiffs in this type of action seek remedy for harms 
they suffer as taxpayers, usually due to illegal government actions or other un-
authorized government decisions.75 The litigation may potentially benefit the 
resident-taxpayers (the class), because the court may enjoin illegal conduct by 
local officials, force city officials to take certain actions, or order damages ei-
ther in favor of the class of plaintiffs or against a third party in favor of the lo-
cal treasury.76 
To better understand the rationale behind taxpayer suits, and how they can 
improve the monitoring of local officials, we begin by looking at their com-
mercial equivalents—class-action suits and shareholders’ derivative litigation. 
Class and derivative actions are important tools that allow shareholders to in-
crease corporate accountability,77 and by understanding their unique features, 
we can improve taxpayer actions to better suit their stated goals. 
A. Class and Derivative Actions in the Commercial Sphere 
Class and derivative actions are unique procedures.78 Both actions do not 
fit the traditional litigation model, as they are designed to address problems 
faced by potential plaintiffs. The problems are liable to prevent plaintiffs from 
                                                        
73  Id. at 663. 
74  74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 10, § 1. 
75  JOHN MARTINEZ, 4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 29:7 (2017). 
76  18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 11, §§ 52:4, :19. 
77  Stephen P. Ferris et al., Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: 
Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 143, 144 (2007). 
78  Alon Klement & Keren Weinshall-Margel, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Class Actions: An 
Israeli Perspective, 172 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 1 (2016). 
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initiating legal action, and the proceedings offer procedural solutions to facili-
tate the litigation.79 
A class-action suit is designed to address the “free rider” (coordination) is-
sue.80 In a typical class-action situation, the defendant allegedly caused substan-
tial damage to a large unorganized group of people, but the damage suffered by 
each individual in the group is relatively small. Due to the small damage suf-
fered by the individual members, most members will be inclined not to sue. 
Their possible recovery does not warrant the costs and risks associated with the 
litigation, and, as a result, the injurer will not be brought to court and will not 
be forced to pay for the damages caused.81 Class-action lawsuits offer a proce-
dural solution to this problem: they allow an individual group member to pros-
ecute as a representative of the group, without the need for all the group mem-
bers to take action.82 The representative plaintiff is required to adequately 
identify the group, and later notify the group members about the proceedings—
however, the group members need not actively participate in the litigation.83 
The group members can opt out of the class action, but if they do not, they are 
bound by the result achieved by the class representative.84 
Derivative suits are designed to solve a different issue—an agency prob-
lem.85 Derivative actions address a situation where corporate officers breach 
their fiduciary duties towards a corporation, and, as a corollary, the corporation 
(and hence its shareholders) suffers damages.86 In principle, the corporation, as 
a legal entity, has the capacity to sue its officers for such breach and recover the 
damages the officers caused. The problem is that the corporate officers—often 
the ones who breached their fiduciary duties in the first place—are the ones 
                                                        
79  Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action 
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1991). 
80  Id. at 8. 
81  Id. at 8–9. 
82  Id. at 9. 
83  Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV 43, 43 
(1989); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative 
Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 NW. L. REV. 423, 426–27 (1993). 
84  Due to the binding nature of class actions, a representative plaintiff must meet several pre-
requisites in order for the class action to be approved. These prerequisites include: numerosi-
ty (the class should be large enough so as to render a joinder of all members impractical), 
commonality (a predominance of the anticipated issues of fact and law raised in the litigation 
proceedings should be common to the class members), and adequacy of representation (the 
group should be adequately represented by the representative plaintiff). The court examines 
the resources of the representative plaintiff, the competence of the representative counsel, the 
relationship between the representative and the class, and so on. When these conditions are 
met, and if the class action is approved and succeeds on the merits, the group members—
those who have not opted out—will receive their portion of the awarded compensation. See 1 
WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, CPLR MANUAL § 7.07[c] (3d ed. 2017). 
85  Macey & Miller, supra note 79, at 10. 
86  Donald E. Schwartz, In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Paper of Profes-
sors Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 322, 327 (1985). 
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who decide whether the corporation will initiate legal proceedings, and natural-
ly, the officers will hardly be inclined to take action against themselves or their 
peers. As a result, the corporation will fail to sue, and will not (nor will its 
shareholders) recover damages.87 Derivative actions solve this problem by em-
powering shareholders to take legal action. They allow a representative share-
holder to take the initiative out of the hands of incumbent officers and sue a 
third party (usually the incumbent officers themselves) on the corporation’s be-
half.88 
Although class and derivative actions address different problems, they 
share common characteristics when compared to traditional models of litiga-
tion, especially with respect to attorney-client relationship.89 As opposed to 
more traditional forms of litigation, in both procedures the plaintiffs’ attorney 
does not represent a particular client or clients, but rather a vague, somewhat 
amorphic, group of allegedly injured parties (the injured class or dispersed 
shareholders).90 Due to the typically large size of such groups and the small re-
covery by each of its members, group members usually do not closely super-
vise their attorney.91 Plaintiffs’ attorneys, therefore, can handle class actions or 
derivative litigation with great freedom and manage them in a way that serves 
their own interests.92 In addition, in both types of actions, the plaintiffs’ attor-
neys usually earn their fees only when the complaint has been successful (re-
covery is awarded from the fund created under the judicial decision or settle-
                                                        
87  Macey & Miller, supra note 79, at 10; Thomas & Hansen, supra note 83, at 427. 
88  The Delaware Supreme Court explained that a derivative action is actually comprised of 
two suits: “First, it is the equivalent of a suit by the shareholders to compel the corporation to 
sue. Second, it is a suit by the corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its behalf, against 
those liable to it.” See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); see also John C. 
Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a 
Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 264 (1981). 
89  John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic 
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. 
L. REV. 669, 677–79 (1986). 
90  Agency problems between an attorney and her clients also exist in traditional forms of 
litigation. In order to minimize these problems, the legal profession developed several mech-
anisms, both market-based and regulatory, designed to incentivize attorneys not to abuse 
their clients’ interests. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 189, 189 (1987). These mechanisms include: bar association admission and 
membership rules, rules of ethical conduct, reputation effects in the market for lawyers and 
so on. See Macey & Miller, supra note 79, at 12–19. All these mechanisms, however, require 
clients, at least to some degree, to monitor their attorneys’ professional conduct. Such moni-
toring is absent in class and derivative actions, where the attorney represents a dispersed 
group of clients. 
91  Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The 
Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 132 (2006); Macey & 
Miller, supra note 79, at 19–20. 
92  Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institu-
tional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 
2054–55 (1995). 
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ment).93 If the court rejects the claim, the plaintiff’s attorney receives nothing, 
even if she invested many hours of work and significant funds in the case.94 
This means that attorneys take cases only when they believe their gains will 
cover their investment.95 
Due to these characteristics—the attorneys’ relative freedom and the suc-
cess-based fees—plaintiffs’ lawyers in class and derivative proceedings are of-
ten considered the entrepreneurs of the litigation.96 Often, it is the lawyer, ra-
ther than her clients, who finds a cause of action worth pursuing, and it is the 
lawyer, rather than her clients, who drives the legal proceedings.97 The lawyers 
in these types of actions are sometimes referred to as “private attorney[s] gen-
eral” and their actions are referred to as private enforcement.98 Like an attorney 
general’s work, the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ work—if successful—benefits the pub-
lic (the plaintiff’s class). The compensation awarded in the action forces poten-
tial violators to pay for the damages they caused, thereby internalizing the costs 
of the defendants’ actions.99 Like an attorney general, plaintiffs’ lawyers also 
monitor corporations for potential causes of action. A viable cause of action 
can be profitable (due to the awarded attorney’s fees), and so lawyers have an 
interest to check the corporate officers for violations, and initiate litigation 
when appropriate.100 
B. Private Enforcement in the Public Sphere 
The conceptual equivalents of the class and derivative actions in the public 
sphere are taxpayer suits.101 Like class and derivative actions, taxpayer suits are 
representative in nature. In the latter, a locality or local official harms a group 
of residents (taxpayers), and an individual resident files a suit to correct the 
wrong on behalf of the group.102 Note that taxpayer suits are distinct from indi-
                                                        
93  Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions, 38 A.L.R. 3d 1384 § 2 
(1971 & Supp. 2018). 
94  Id. § 3; Waters v. City of Chicago, 420 N.E.2d 599, 604 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). 
95  Thomas & Hansen, supra note 83, at 431–33; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 248, 249 (2010). 
96  Coffee, supra note 89, at 678 (“our legal system has long accepted, if somewhat uneasily, 
the concept of the plaintiff’s attorney as an entrepreneur who performs the socially useful 
function of deterring undesirable conduct”). 
97  Williams v. Balcor Pension Inv., 150 F.R.D 109, 118 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
98  Gilles & Friedman, supra note 91, at 108–16. See generally William B. Rubenstein, On 
What a Private Attorney General Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2143–45 
(2004). 
99  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 349–50 (1973). 
100  Guy Halfteck, The Law Enforcement Venture: Understanding the Effects of Investment in 
Class Actions on Corporate Liability Exposure 1, 3, 11–12 (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin 
Ct. for L., Econ., and Bus., Paper No. 452, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=497442 
[https://perma.cc/XSC4-NZ52]. 
101  74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 10, § 4. 
102  18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 11, § 52:2. 
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vidual suits filed by taxpayers.103 In an individual suit, the action is designed to 
redress a private injury suffered by an individual taxpayer.104 The individual 
taxpayer turns to the courts for his own benefit, not for the benefit of an unde-
fined public (a class of taxpayers).105 General taxpayer suits, on the other hand, 
are designed to redress a public injury.106 The plaintiff raises an issue common 
to a class of taxpayers, and the requested remedy benefits the class as a whole, 
rather than the plaintiff alone.107 In this article, we focus solely on general tax-
payer suits, rather than on individual suits filed by taxpayers. 
In most states, a taxpayer suit resembles a class action. A taxpayer believes 
that the locality acts illegally or wastes public funds, and sues the local authori-
ty for remedy.108 In case the claim is affirmed, the local authority is enjoined 
from taking the illegal or wasteful action or is directed to pay damages to the 
injured public (the class). Some states also allow for derivative taxpayer ac-
tions109 (Qui Tam actions).110 A derivative taxpayer action, just like derivative 
actions in the commercial sphere, is not directed against the local authority it-
self, but rather against a third party—a local official or person (entity) who re-
ceives an illegal benefit from the local authority. When the locality fails (or re-
fuses) to take advantage of a cause of action it has against such third party, a 
taxpayer can initiate an action in lieu of the local authority.111 The action is 
filed on the local authority’s behalf, and damages, if recovered, go to the local 
authority as well.112 Other taxpayers thus benefit from the litigation derivative-
ly, when the local treasury is enriched.113 
                                                        
103  Id. § 52:1. 
104  Id. § 52:2. 
105  Id. 
106  Id. 
107  Id.; 74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 10, § 1. 
108  1 STEVENSON & VAN WIE, supra note 59, § 73.04. 
109  18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 11, § 52:18; Veazey v. Bd. of Educ. of Rich Twp. High Sch. 
Dist. 227, 59 N.E.3d 857, 864 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (“Taxpayers may have standing to sue ei-
ther in their personal capacity as taxpayers or derivatively on behalf of a local governmental 
unit (taxpayer derivative).”). 
110  Qui Tam action is an action filed by an individual on behalf of a government. The idiom 
“Qui Tam” is short for the Latin phrase: “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso,” which 
means “he who acts on the King’s behalf as well as his own.” See Jan P. Mensz, Note, Citi-
zen Police: Using the Qui Tam Provision of the False Claims Act to Promote Racial and 
Economic Integration in Housing, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1137, 1149 n.76 (2010). See 
also Franziska Hertel, Note, Qui Tam for Tax? Lessons from the States, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
1897, 1897–98 (2013). In the article, we refer to these actions as derivative actions, in order 
to emphasize the resemblance between the public and the commercial spheres. 
111  18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 11, § 52:20. 
112  1 STEVENSON & VAN WIE, supra note 59, § 73.01. 
113  In states that allow a derivative taxpayer suit, the taxpayer is often required to show she 
has requested the local authority to bring suit and that the local officials refused to do so. If 
these conditions are met, taxpayers can litigate in the name of the local authority. See id. 
§ 73.01[3]. 
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The rationales for allowing taxpayer suits in the public sphere resemble 
those of class and derivative actions in the commercial sphere.114 First, a harm-
ful governmental act—for example, a waste of public funds—often does not 
significantly affect individual residents. The public as whole may be injured, 
but, due to the size of the locality, the loss each individual resident incurs may 
be negligible. A taxpayer suit facilitates the aggregation of these damages.115 It 
empowers the representative plaintiff to litigate in the name of the public (the 
class as a whole), and to ask the court for a remedy that will benefit all injured 
members, rather than the plaintiff alone.116 Moreover, many governmental ac-
tions affect residents in an equal manner. Individual residents do not suffer a 
particular damage, because the local action (law or policy) involves the public 
rather than distinct members thereof. Thus, since the general standing rule re-
quires the plaintiff to show a particular injury, the primary purpose of the tax-
payer suit is to “enable a large body of the citizenry to challenge governmental 
action which would otherwise go unchallenged in the courts because of the 
standing requirement.”117 It renders the regular standing rules more flexible and 
enables courts to scrutinize governmental acts to the benefit of the general pub-
lic.118 
Secondly, a taxpayer suit in its derivative form enables taxpayers to de-
crease “favoritism” on behalf of the local officials.119 In cases where a senior 
local official acts improperly or where a municipality grants an illegal favor to 
a third party, the municipality itself may have little incentive to take action. The 
local attorney general may not wish to sue her colleagues, and political interests 
may deter local officials from confronting prominent donors, powerful corpora-
tions, or constituent-interest groups.120 A derivative-taxpayer suit can overcome 
this agency problem by empowering residents to take the initiative to litigate 
through the municipality.121 When, due to political interests or other ulterior 
                                                        
114  Gram v. Vill. of Shoreview, 106 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Minn. 1960) (“By analogy, the right 
of a taxpayer to maintain [a taxpayer’s suit] is based on the same principles as the right of a 
stockholder in a private corporation to bring an action against the corporation or its offic-
ers . . . ”); see also Bevelander v. Town of Islip, 10 A.D.2d 170, 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960); 
Richard A. Epstein, Standing in Law & Equity: A Defense of Citizen and Taxpayer Suits, 6 
GREEN BAG 2D 17, 22–23 (2002). 
115  Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending–The Role of Legal and Equitable Principles, 
4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2001). 
116  18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 11, § 52:2. 
117  Note, Taxpayers’ Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895, 904 (1960); Faden v. 
Phila. Hous. Auth., 227 A.2d 619, 621–22 (Pa. 1967). 
118  Taxpayers’ Suits: A Survey and Summary, supra note 117, at 896, 899–900. 
119  Id. at 904 (“Such litigation allows the courts . . . to add to the controls over public offi-
cials inherent in the elective process the judicial scrutiny of the statutory and constitutional 
validity of their acts”). 
120  As a New York Court phrased it: “This utter helplessness of the tax-payer, and the fact 
that he was entirely at the mercy of officials who might prove unworthy of and criminally 
unfaithful to their trust, became an evil calling loudly for correction.” See Ayers v. Law-
rence, 59 N.Y. 192, 195–96 (N.Y. 1874). 
121  Epstein, supra note 115, at 28–29. 
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motives, local officials refuse to take advantage of a potentially beneficial 
cause of action, a representative resident can go to court and demand what 
rightfully belongs to the local treasury.122 This not only enriches the locality, 
but also improves the monitoring of local officials and lessens the power of in-
terest groups in the locality. 
Thirdly, and as a corollary of the rationales above, a taxpayer suit enables 
individual members of the public (the plaintiffs and their lawyers) to influence 
public policy and monitor their elected officials.123 Residents, who usually in-
fluence public policy only through the ballot box, can go to court and try to en-
join a government action, receive compensation, or prevent corruption. Just like 
in the commercial sphere, taxpayer suits can create an “army of potential pri-
vate attorneys general.”124 Although the taxpayer plaintiffs may turn to court 
from personal motives (political, economic, or other), the creation of a large 
army of monitors can discipline officials and facilitate a more efficient gov-
ernment. As the New Jersey court explained, 
A taxpayer’s suit is one of our system’s strongest deterrents to corruption. It is a 
powerful check upon complacent or dishonest public officials. It is one effica-
cious mode by which an alert citizenry is able to maintain that eternal vigilance 
which still remains the price of freedom . . . Such an action then must not be un-
necessarily restricted by the court through narrow judicial interpretation.125 
And indeed, due to these rationales, private enforcement on local govern-
ments in the form of taxpayer actions has existed as early as the mid-19th cen-
tury.126 Initially, courts have based their jurisdiction on these actions using eq-
uity law.127 Some courts viewed taxpayers as equity owners of the local 
                                                        
122  As early as 1881, John F. Dillon wrote in his treatise: 
But if the officers of the corporation are parties to the wrong, or if they will not discharge their 
duty, why may not any inhabitant, and particularly any taxable inhabitant, be allowed to main-
tain a suit to prevent or avoid the illegal act? Such a right is especially necessary in the case of 
municipal and public corporations, and if it be denied they are liable to be plundered, and the 
taxpayers and property-owners on whom the loss will eventually fall are without effectual reme-
dy. 
2 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 908 (3d ed. 
1881). 
123  Taxpayers’ Suits: A Survey and Summary, supra note 117, at 904. 
124  Id. 
125  Theurer v. Borrone, 195 A.2d 215, 218 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1963); 1 STEVENSON & 
VAN WIE, supra note 59, § 73.04. 
126  Adriance v. Mayor of New York, 1 Barb. 19, 19–20 (N.Y.S. 1847). In this case, the 
plaintiff argued that the city council was improvidently wasting funds “by appropriating 
them to purposes not warranted by their act of incorporation.” Judge Edmonds expressed 
some doubts about the court’s jurisdiction over the case, but since the defendants conceded 
to the court’s jurisdiction, he allowed it. 
127  Susan L. Parsons, Commentary, Taxpayers’ Suits: Standing Barriers and Pecuniary Re-
straints, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 951, 953 (1986). 
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government’s property,128 and others adopted a trust theory.129 By the end of the 
19th century, local taxpayer suits were widely adopted. In 1879, for example, 
the Supreme Court allowed Zabriskie (a taxpayer) to challenge a transaction, 
made by the County of Hudson, for the purchase of real-estate to build a court-
room.130 The court affirmed the claim, and explained Zabriskie’s right to chal-
lenge the transaction as follows: 
Of the right of resident tax-payers to invoke the interposition of a court of equity 
to prevent an illegal disposition of the moneys of the county or the illegal crea-
tion of a debt which they [sic] in common with other property-holders of the 
county may otherwise be compelled to pay, there is at this day no serious ques-
tion. The right has been recognized by the State courts in numerous cases; and 
from the nature of the powers exercised by municipal corporations, the great 
danger of their abuse and the necessity of prompt action to prevent irremediable 
injuries, it would seem eminently proper for courts of equity to interfere upon 
the application of the tax-payers of a county to prevent the consummation of a 
wrong, when the officers of those corporations assume, in excess of their pow-
ers, to create burdens upon property-holders.131 
In time, some states also provided a statutory basis for local or state tax-
payer suits (hereinafter “Taxpayer Statutes”).132 The Taxpayer Statutes formal-
ize the courts’ rulings, providing the courts with guidelines on handling such 
cases. They detail the grounds that a taxpayer may file such suits under the 
remedies she can receive, certain conditions for the filing (a minimum number 
of taxpayers, a bond requirement, etc.), and so on.133 
Naturally, different states allow for different grounds for taxpayer actions. 
By and large, though, we can divide the causes of action into several categories. 
The most important category is the waste of local property.134 Taxpayers attack 
local actions that they believe squander public funds and deplete the treasury—
for example, unlawful compensation to local officials,135 disposition of local 
                                                        
128  As equity owners, taxpayers have a right of action when their property is wasted, espe-
cially when an illegality of some sort can be proven. See People v. Holten, 122 N.E. 540, 
542 (Ill. 1919). 
129  Under which the residents (taxpayers) are the beneficiaries and the local officials are the 
trustees. As trustees, the local officials have fiduciary duties toward the residents, and the 
residents have a right to take action when the duty is violated. See Haddock v. Bd. of Pub. 
Educ., 84 A.2d 157, 162 (Del. Ch. 1951); see also David M. Lawrence, Local Government 
Officials as Fiduciaries: The Appropriate Standard, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(1993). 
130  Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601, 607–09 (1879). 
131  Id. at 609 (emphasis added). 
132  18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 11, § 52:2. 
133  A more elaborate description and analysis of such statutes are given in Part C below. 
134  74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 10, § 18; SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW § 73.04 (2d ed. 2013). 
135  See, e.g., Chapman v. Bevilacqua, 42 S.W.3d 378, 384 (Ark. 2001); Miller v. Town of 
Gorham, 620 N.Y.S.2d 735, 735 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994); City of Berea ex rel. Ward v. Trupo, 
753 N.E.2d 286, 287 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
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assets in less than their fair value,136 or unlawful local expenditures.137 The 
Mississippi Taxpayers Statute, for example, was used to reclaim $300,000 from 
Greg Davis, the mayor of Southaven, because the city financed his couples’ 
therapy and other personal expenses.138 A taxpayer suit was also filed against 
the City of Warr Acres in Oklahoma, because the city spent large sums of mon-
ey in order to attract Wal-Mart to the city and taxpayers viewed the expenditure 
as a waste of public funds.139 
A second category involves a taxpayers’ attempt to void unauthorized or 
ultra-vires contracts.140 Under this category a locality fails to properly authorize 
a contract, or a contract is signed in a conflict of interest situation,141 and tax-
payers attempt to annul the contract.142 Cincinnati, for example, approved an 
ordinance allowing the city to sign an agreement to lease its parking system, 
and taxpayers argued that the approval of such ordinance required a referendum 
and tried to enjoin the signature.143 A third category relates to local taxation 
processes.144 This can take place either when a group of taxpayers is illegally 
assessed,145 or when an illegal subsidy is given (thereby forcing other taxpayers 
to pay more taxes).146 In the City of La Habra, California, for example, taxpay-
ers challenged a utility-user tax, that used the revenues for general governmen-
tal purposes.147 In a village in Nassau County, New York, taxpayers challenged 
a property tax exemption given to an adjacent property, because they argued 
that they were subject to higher property tax as a result.148 And yet a fourth cat-
                                                        
136  See, e.g., Betters v. Knabel, 288 A.D.2d 872, 872 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Rath v. Two 
Rivers Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 467 NW.2d 150, 151–52 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991); 74 AM. JUR. 2D, 
supra note 10, § 21. 
137  Lehigh v. Pittston Co., 456 A.2d 355, 355 (Me. 1983); Shechtman v. Sverdrup & Parcel 
Consultants, Inc, 226 A.D.2d 268, 268 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Duffy v. Longo, 207 A.D.2d 
860, 861 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Dibb v. Cty. of San Diego, 884 P.2d 1003, 1003 (Cal. 
1994); 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 11, §§ 52.31–.33. 
138  Davis v. State ex rel. Hood, 198 So.3d 367, 369 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). 
139  State ex rel. Brown v. City of Warr Acres, 946 P.2d 1140, 1142–43 (Okla. 1997). 
140  74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 10, § 25; STEVENSON, supra note 134, § 73.04[11]. 
141  Roosevelt v. Draper, 23 N.Y. 318, 329 (1861). 
142  See, e.g., Sullins v. Cent. Ark. Water, 454 S.W.3d 727, 727 (Ark. 2015); Westbrook v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 524 N.E.2d 485, 485 (Ohio 1988); State ex rel. Fent v. Okla. Wa-
ter Res. Bd., 66 P.3d 432, 433 (Okla. 2003). 
143  McQueen v. Dohoney, No. C–1301962013, WL 2647762, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013). 
144  74 AM. JUR., supra note 10, §§ 19–20; STEVENSON, supra note 134, § 73.04 [7]–[8]. 
145  See, e.g., Batt v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 716, 718 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007); Rider v. City of San Diego, No. D044907, 2005 WL 1391262, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2005); Fairley v. City of Duluth, 185 N.W. 390, 390 (Minn. 1921); State ex rel. Fatur v. City 
of Eastlake, No. 2009–L–037, 2010 WL 1254369, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010). 
146  See, e.g., Square Parking Sys., Inc. v. Jersey City Bus. Adm’r, 449 A.2d 559, 560 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982); City of Wichita Falls v. Cooper, 170 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1943). 
147  Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n. v. City of La Habra, 23 P.3d 601, 603 (Cal. 2001). 
148  Colella v. Bd. of Assessors of the Cty. of Nassau, 741 N.E.2d 113, 113 (N.Y. 2000). 
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egory involves challenging local policies, often connected to civil liberties.149 
Under this category, taxpayers contested policies connected to access to local 
information,150 environmental policies,151 animal policies,152 and more.153 
Today local taxpayers’ right to file a taxpayer suit is acknowledged in al-
most all states—either through statute or in equity.154 The variety of issues tax-
payer suits deal with, and the fact that they are broadly acknowledged, may 
create the impression that they are also widely used. But, in fact, the opposite is 
true. Taxpayer actions are rarely used, and they are certainly not as common as 
class or derivative actions in the commercial sphere. We elaborate on the scar-
city of taxpayer suits later on in the article, but before we do so, we need to ad-
dress a preliminary issue—standing. 
C. Standing in Local-Taxpayer Suits 
The legal literature on taxpayer suits often emphasizes a standing prob-
lem.155 This literature focuses mostly on the federal court system and on federal 
or state taxpayer suits, and extensively analyzes the Federal Supreme Court’s 
decision to deny standing to taxpayers.156 This may create a misleading impres-
sion that taxpayers lack standing altogether. But, whereas standing poses an un-
surmountable obstacle for federal and state taxpayer suits on the federal level, it 
presents less of a problem to local taxpayers, especially in the state system. 
The standing requirement, at least in the federal system, stems from Article 
III, Section 2 of the Constitution that vests the courts with power over “cases” 
and “controversies.”157 Federal courts interpreted this section to require plain-
tiffs to demonstrate sufficient stake in their action’s outcome, otherwise the ac-
tion is rejected for lack of standing.158 In order to show sufficient stake in the 
outcome, federal courts required plaintiffs to meet three conditions: the plaintiff 
has to show she suffered a concrete and particular injury, that the injury was 
                                                        
149  74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 10, § 25. 
150  Comps, Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 269 A.D.2d 446, 446 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
151  Garfield Heights ex rel. Kozelka v. City of Garfield Heights, No. 92511, 2009 WL 
3043577, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009). 
152  Humane Soc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 277, 278–79 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007). 
153  See generally Coshow v. City of Escondido, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 19, 21 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
154  Taxpayers’ Suits: A Survey and Summary, supra note 117, at 895 (“ ‘[T]axpayers’ suits,’ 
a form of action currently available to challenge state action in at least thirty-four states, and 
municipal action in virtually every jurisdiction”). 
155  See James W. Doggett, “Trickle Down” Constitutional Interpretation: Should Federal 
Limits on Legislative Conferral of Standing Be Imported into State Constitutional Law?, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 839 (2008); James R. Parks, A New Theory of Taxpayer Standing, 6 
COLUM. J. TAX L. 118, 120 (2014); Epstein, supra note 114, at 18; Staudt, supra note 34, at 
773; Zelinsky, supra note 34, at 2. 
156  Epstein, supra note 114, at 18–19; Epstein, supra note 115, at 4,12. 
157  U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2. 
158  Staudt, supra note 34, at 782. 
18 NEV. L.J. 657, KIMHI - FINAL 5/30/18  11:55 AM 
678 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:657 
caused by allegedly illegal conduct, and that the court’s decision is capable of 
redressing the plaintiff’s harm.159 Without these elements, there is no “case” or 
“controversy,” and the courts have no jurisdiction.160 
In the 1923 case of Frothingham v. Mellon, it was determined that federal 
and state taxpayers do not satisfy these conditions in taxpayer suits (in the fed-
eral system).161 The Frothingham Court denied standing to a federal taxpayer 
aiming to enjoin the federal government expenditures under the Maternity Act 
of 1921, explaining that the plaintiff’s interest in the government’s action was 
shared with millions of others, and that it was relatively minute and indetermi-
nable.162 Under these circumstances, the court concluded, taxpayers can show 
no concrete personal harm, and therefore do not meet the federal court’s stand-
ing requirement.163 Despite a potential diversion at the end of the 1960s,164 the 
Frothingham rule still stands, and today it is clear that federal and state taxpay-
ers have no standing to challenge federal or state taxing or expenditures in fed-
eral courts.165 
However, this is not the case with municipal taxpayers. The Frothingham 
Court expressly distinguished between municipal and federal taxpayers, mainly 
due to the local governments’ smaller size.166 As opposed to state or federal 
governments, Justice Sutherland reasoned, local governments have fewer resi-
dents, and so the “interest of a taxpayer of a municipality in the application of 
                                                        
159  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
160  Id. at 561. 
161  Commonwealth of Mass. (Frothingham) v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923). 
162  Id. at 487. 
163  Id. at 488. 
164  In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85–103 (1968), the Supreme Court introduced a possible 
exception to the bar on taxpayer suits. Chief Justice Warren explained that there was “no ab-
solute bar in Article III to suits by federal taxpayers . . . ” Id. at 101. The court clarified that a 
taxpayer can establish standing if she demonstrates a logical link between her status (as a 
taxpayer) and two factors: the type of legislative enactment attacked and the nature of the 
constitutional infringement alleged. Id. at 102. Applying these tests to facts in Flast, the 
Court reached the conclusion that the appellants had standing. Id. at 103. The challenged ac-
tion involved a substantial expenditure of Federal tax funds, and the expenditures violated 
the establishment clause. Id. at 85–86. Subsequent cases, however, clarified that, notwith-
standing the Flast decision, the general rule largely stands. In DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cu-
no, 547 U.S. 332, 332–34 (2006), for example, the Court declined to grant standing to plain-
tiffs who challenged a package of state and local tax credits given to Daimler-Chrysler. 
Chief Justice Roberts determined that the general standing rule announced in Frothingham 
still applies, and that the plaintiffs did not show a concrete and particular injury. Id. at 344. 
In Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011), the Court held 
the same approach, narrowing the Flast exception even further. The majority in Winn deter-
mined that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they challenged the organization’s tax cred-
its as opposed to challenging government spending (as was the case in Flast). Id. Tax credits, 
according to the majority, do not constitute a concrete injury, because the taxpayers cannot 
prove that if the tax credits had not been given, the taxpayers would benefit from a reduction 
in their own taxes. Id. 
165  Zelinsky, supra note 34, at 52. 
166  Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486. 
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its moneys is direct and immediate and the remedy by injunction to prevent 
their misuse is not inappropriate.”167 Although local governments are signifi-
cantly larger today than they were in 1923, when the Frothingham decision was 
decided, this holding was confirmed in Asarco Inc. v. Kadish in 1989.168 In 
Asarco, the Court allowed municipal taxpayer suits, because it determined that 
the peculiar relationship between the local taxpayer and the local government 
“makes the taxpayer’s interest in the application of municipal revenues ‘direct 
and immediate.’ ”169 This holding has not been reversed in later Supreme Court 
cases, such as DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno170 or Arizona Christian School 
Tuition Organization v. Winn,171 and so—as opposed to state or federal taxpay-
ers—municipal taxpayers do have standing in federal court. 
Standing rules in state courts are even more lenient.172 State courts do not 
see themselves as bound by the “cases” and “controversies” requirement of Ar-
ticle III,173 and different states have developed their own standing rules, that are 
usually more permissive than the federal one.174 The requirements for standing 
may change from state to state, but in many states, at least with regard to in-
junctive relief, the plaintiff does not need to show special and particular injury. 
It is sufficient that the plaintiff show a public injury in order for the court to 
have jurisdiction.175 
As we have seen, in some states, the legislatures believed that the courts’ 
decisions allowing standing (usually based on equity law) are not enough, and 
provided a statutory or even constitutional basis for local (or state) taxpayer 
standing.176 Arkansas’ constitution, for example, affirms that “[a]ny citizen of 
any county, city or town may institute suit, in behalf of himself and all others 
interested, to protect the inhabitants thereof against the enforcement of any ille-
                                                        
167  Id. at 478, 486. 
168  Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 606 (1989). 
169  Id. at 613. 
170  DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006). 
171  Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 146 (2011). 
172  Zelinsky, supra note 34, at 36. 
173  See, e.g., Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Cmty. Servs. in Ariz., 712 P.2d 
914, 919 (Ariz. 1985); Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1102 (Utah 2013). 
174  M. Ryan Harmanis, States’ Stances on Public Interest Standing, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 729, 
729 (2015); William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court 
Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 263, 264 (1990). The Supreme Court 
acknowledged the states’ authority in this issue, and even when it found that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing in the federal system, accepted the state courts’ power to adjudicate matters 
under their own rules. See Asarco, 490 U.S. at 617 (“We have recognized often that the con-
straints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not 
bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even 
when they address issues of federal law, as when they are called upon to interpret the Consti-
tution or, in this case, a federal statute”); see also Staudt, supra note 34, at 774. 
175  18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 11, §§ 52:13–:16; 74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 10, §§ 7–12. 
176  18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 11, § 52:2. 
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gal exactions whatever.”177 South Dakota allows taxpayers to maintain action to 
prevent any violation of Title 9 of the State Code (the title that deals with mu-
nicipal governments),178 and the Californian provision grants taxpayers stand-
ing to contest “any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, 
funds, or other property of a county, town, city or city and county of the 
state.”179 Depending on the jurisdiction, standing may be granted not only 
against a locality, but also against its officers or other third parties that wasted 
the public funds, which we refer to as a derivative-taxpayer suit. The New York 
statute, for example, affirms that “all officers, agents, commissioners and other 
persons acting . . . on behalf of any . . . municipal corporation in this 
state . . . may be prosecuted . . . to restore and make good, any property, funds 
or estate.”180 In Oklahoma, when authorized state or local officials fail to insti-
tute proper proceedings by law to recover state or local property, residents may 
initiate legal proceedings in lieu of the officials.181 
Due to the more lenient standing rules for municipal taxpayers, and espe-
cially in states that have an express statutory authorization for taxpayer actions, 
it seems reasonable to assume that the use of this tool will be prevalent. The 
expectation is that, just like in regard to commercial class and derivative ac-
tions, taxpayers will employ the taxpayer suit to monitor local officials and re-
cover damages. The data we gathered, however, indicates otherwise: local tax-
payer suits are not very common—in some states they are virtually non-
existent, especially when compared to their commercial equivalents. In the next 
part, we present the data. 
III. THE DATA ON LOCAL TAXPAYER SUITS AND POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
To understand to what extent local taxpayer suits are utilized in state 
courts, we made use of the Lexis-Nexis database. We looked at hundreds of lo-
cal taxpayer suits and analyzed how they were received. Our research focuses 
mainly on states that have local Taxpayer Statutes, because in these states, the 
case law on taxpayer suits is more easily traceable, but we also looked for cases 
in other states as well. 
The analysis included two stages: first, using Lexis-Nexis, we searched for 
cases that cite local Taxpayer Statutes. This enabled us to assess how many lo-
cal taxpayer suits were filed in these states, and to what extent this procedure is 
utilized.182 Second, in several states we delved into the cases, and read the 
courts’ opinions. This enabled us to understand on what occasions taxpayers 
                                                        
177  ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. XVI, § 13. 
178  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 9-1-6 (2017). 
179  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (West 2017). 
180  N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 51 (McKinney 2017). 
181  OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 373 (West 2017). 
182  The reason we used the statutes, rather than a general search for taxpayer suits, is that it 
is impossible to differentiate between taxpayer suits and individual suits filed by taxpayers in 
searching the database. 
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decide to initiate a taxpayer action, what remedies they seek, and how the 
courts view these actions. The two stages of analysis create a picture of how 
taxpayer suits are utilized, and whether they indeed provide an efficient tool to 
monitor local officials. 
A. The Citation Search 
The first stage of the analysis was a “technical” search for citations of local 
Taxpayer Statutes in court opinions in the past twenty-six years (since 1990). 
We refer to this search as technical, because at this stage of the analysis, we did 
not look into the various cases or the context of the citation. We simply counted 
how many times such cases were cited, as they appeared in the Lexis-Nexis da-
tabase. 
Our assumption in this analysis was that courts that deal with taxpayer ac-
tions will cite the enabling Taxpayer Statute. If this assumption is indeed cor-
rect, the number of cases citing Taxpayer Statutes serves as a good approxima-
tion to the number of times the taxpayer action was used in the different states. 
Naturally, courts can discuss these actions without referring to their statutory 
source, but we do expect most courts to at least mention the statute (when they 
deal with a taxpayer suit), even if they do not discuss it at length. Note also 
that, since at this stage we did not read the citing decisions (just technically 
counted them), the search results could have been over-inclusive.183 Some of 
the decisions may cite the Taxpayer Statute, even though the cases were not 
taxpayer actions, and other decisions may have been duplicates (i.e., two deci-
sions discussing the same case, for example, a trial court and an appeal). But, 
despite these problems, we believe the number of citations does give us a fairly 
good estimate of the frequency that taxpayers use the tool the legislature pro-
vided them. 






                                                        
183  In states where we read all of the courts’ decisions, the table indicates the exact number 
of cases that deal with taxpayer actions, rather than the number that appears in Lexis. 
184  The table is updated as of November 14, 2016. States marked with “*” are ones for 
which we read all of the case law. In these states, there is a difference between the number of 
cases we know are taxpayer suits, and the number of citations as they appear in the Lexis-
Nexis database. This is because some of the cases cited the Taxpayer Statute, but were not 
taxpayer suits. In the table, the number of cases is the actual number of taxpayer suits, 
whereas the number in parentheses is the number of citations that appear in Lexis-Nexis. 
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State Statutes authorizing taxpayer suits (“Taxpay-






Arkansas* ARK. CONST. art. XVI, § 13. 85  
Arizona* ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 35-213 (2017) (applies to 
both state and local taxpayers); 





California* CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (West 2017). 188 (265)  
Illinois 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-5-1 (2017); 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/20-104 (2017) (De-
rivative Taxpayer suit). 
2 
14  
Indiana  IND. CODE § 4-6-2-124 (definition); 
IND. CODE §§ 34-13-5-1–12; 
IND. CODE § 36-2-6-13. 
13  
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-907 (2017). 34  
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40 § 53 (West 
2017). 
38  
Michigan185 MICH. COMP. LAWS. SERV. § 129.61 (2017) 
(applies to townships and school districts); 
MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 32 (applies to both 




Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 31-7-57 (West 2017). 11 
New Jersey N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:15-18 (2017) (deriva-
tive); 




New York* N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 51 (Consol. 2015) 117 (144) 
Ohio* OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 733.59 (2017); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 309.13 (counties);  
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5705.45 (liability 




Oklahoma* OKLA. STAT. tit. 62, § 373 (2017). 23 (25) 
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 9-1-6 (2017). 1  
                                                        
185  In addition to the two sections listed in the table, MICH. CONST. art. XI, § 5, empowers 
any resident of the state to request injunctive or mandamus relief in order to enforce the 
state’s civil service laws. We did not include the section in the table, as it refers only to state, 
rather than local governments. 
18 NEV. L.J. 657, KIMHI - FINAL 5/30/18  11:55 AM 
Spring 2018] PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 683 
As we can see from the table, in most states there were less than fifty tax-
payer actions in twenty-six years (i.e., less than two taxpayer actions per year). 
In only two states (California and Ohio), there were more than 150 actions, that 
translates to an average of seven taxpayer actions per year. Overall, in the four-
teen states we examined, there were approximately 700 local taxpayer cases in 
twenty-six years, that means each general-purpose local government in these 
states dealt, on average, with 0.04 lawsuits186 (or 4 percent of the general-
purpose local governments dealt with an average of one lawsuit per year for the 
past twenty-six years).187 
These numbers seem especially low when compared to commercial class-
action litigation. According to a survey conducted by Carlton Fields, the num-
ber of companies facing at least one major class-action suit per year increased 
from 53.8 percent in 2014 to 60.6 percent in 2015.188 On average, according to 
the same survey, each company had to deal with one additional new class-
action suit in 2015,189 bringing the average number of class-action suits per 
company to six.190 As the table above reflects, the vast majority of municipal 
                                                        
186  According to the United States Census Bureau, in the fourteen states detailed in the table, 
there are 37,324 local governments, 16,779 of which are general-purpose local governments. 
2012 Census of Governments, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: AMERICAN FACT FINDER, 
https://factfinder.census.gov [https://perma.cc/6GGA-6SZ4] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018) (fol-
low “Guided Search” hyperlink; then select “Specific Data Set”; then choose “Census of 
Governments,” select the “2012 Census of Governments,” and click next; then enter each of 
the states provided from the table above into the search and click next; then, from the list 
provided, select “Local Governments in Individual County-Type Areas: 2012”). In the past 
twenty-six years, there were 700 lawsuits in 16,779 localities, i.e.-an average of 0.04 law-
suits per municipality. In other words, 4 percent of the general-purpose municipalities in the 
states faced a single suit. 
187  If we look at all local governments in the states, including special purpose local govern-
ments, the numbers are even lower—2.3 percent. 
188  CARLTON FIELDS, THE 2016 CARLTON FIELDS CLASS ACTION SURVEY: BEST PRACTICES IN 
REDUCING COST AND MANAGING RISK IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 6 (2016). 
189  Id. at 11. 
190  Id. at 3. The issues commercial class actions deal with vary, but according to the survey, 
class actions dealing with labor and employment practices and with consumer fraud account 
for more than 50 percent of the overall claims. 
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corporations in the surveyed states had zero local-taxpayer suits filed against 
them in twenty-six years. Even if we take only a small subset of the class-
action suits, i.e. federal securities class actions,191 the number of taxpayer suits 
is very small in comparison. According to a report on federal securities class-
action suits by Cornerstone Research, each year, an average of 188 securities 
class-action suits are filed.192 The number of local taxpayer suits filed each year 
in all of the above states combined (twenty-seven suits) is a seventh of the 
number of securities class-action suits, even though the number of local gov-
ernments in these states is almost four times the number of listed companies.193 
In addition to the number of local taxpayer cases, the timing of the litiga-
tion is also telling. Empirical evidence suggests that commercial class and de-
rivative actions tend to follow visible adverse corporate events. A corporation 
experiences an extraordinary event—such as a SEC investigation, a failed mer-
ger, or a bankruptcy—and shortly after the news about the event has been re-
leased, a private enforcement litigation is initiated.194 The proximity between 
the publication of the adverse corporate event and the filing indicates that the 
publication prompted the litigation, rather than the injury to a particular cli-
ent.195 This is not the case as far as taxpayer suits are concerned. Here, we see 
little correlation between the filings and local corruption or fiscal distress. In 
2000, Camden, New Jersey’s mayor, for example, was indicted and then con-
victed on federal corruption charges.196 Although the New Jersey statute allows 
every taxpayer or resident of a municipality to initiate litigation on behalf of a 
                                                        
191  According to the Carlton Fields survey, securities class actions comprise 8 percent of all 
class actions. Id. at 7. 
192  CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2016 MIDYEAR 
ASSESSMENT 5 (2016) (The research was conducted in association with the Stanford Law 
School Securities Class Action Clearing House). 
193  According to a World Bank report, in 2015 there were 4,381 listed companies in the 
United States. Listed Domestic Companies, Total, WORLD BANK 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO?locations=US&view=chart 
[https://perma.cc/K2KB-XRU8] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018). Compared to 36,359 local gov-
ernments, 16,399 of which are general purpose local governments in the states listed in the 
table above. See 2012 Census of Governments, supra note 186. 
194  John E. Kennedy, Securities Class and Derivative Actions in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas: An Empirical Study, 14 HOUS. L. REV. 769, 807 
(1977) (“The data here tends to support the theory that a dramatic event gives rise to a large 
number of filed cases.”); see also Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 92, at 2060 n.32 (accord-
ing to the data, 68.8 percent of the derivative and class actions filed by Weiss’s law firm 
were filed ten days after the facts that gave rise to the plaintiffs’ claims were revealed). The 
article also cites to Milt Policzer, showing that “of 46 class actions studied, 12 were filed 
within one day and another 30 were filed within one week of publication of unfavorable 
news about defendant corporation.” Id. 
195  Coffee, supra note 89, at 681–82. 
196  Anne Marie Vassallo, Note, Solving Camden’s Crisis: Makeover or Takeover?, 33 
RUTGERS L.J. 185, 190 (2001); Iver Peterson, In Camden, Another Mayor Is Indicted on 
Corruption Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/31/nyre 
gion/in-camden-another-mayor-is-indicted-on-corruption-charges.html [https://perma.cc/ZK 
2N-KJJA]. 
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municipality, no taxpayer suits were filed in connection with this event.197 Nei-
ther were any taxpayer suits filed in connection with the Orange County Em-
bezzlement198 or with Detroit’s bankruptcy.199 Although these events were 
highly publicized and no doubt damaged the cities or counties involved, the 
taxpayer procedure was not utilized. 
These differences suggest that, despite the similarities between local-
taxpayer actions and commercial class and derivative actions, the plaintiffs’ use 
of these procedures is very different. Whereas class and derivative actions are 
numerous and tend to follow publicized events, local taxpayer suits are scarce 
and sporadic. 
B. Examining the Decisions 
To better understand the source of these differences, we delved into the de-
cisions themselves, reading hundreds of court decisions and looking at charac-
teristics that can explain the way plaintiffs use local-taxpayer suits. In some 
states, namely Arizona, Arkansas, California, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, and 
Illinois,200 we read and mapped all courts’ opinions citing the Statutes since 
1990.201 In other states, we only read key cases that determined the prevailing 
law on local taxpayer suits in each state. The analysis focused on two main 
characteristics—the remedy plaintiffs seek and the courts’ attitude towards tax-
payer claims. 
1. The Remedy Sought 
In almost all states examined (except Oklahoma), the majority of taxpayer 
suits are for an injunctive or declaratory relief.202 Some taxpayer suits are also 
for a writ of mandamus, but very few seek monetary recovery. 
                                                        
197  As the table above shows, since 1990, only five taxpayer suits were filed in New Jersey, 
none of which concern Camden’s mayor’s criminal affairs. 
198  See MARK BALDASSARE, WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY 
1, 3 (1998); Kevin P. Kearns, Accountability and Entrepreneurial Public Management: The 
Case of the Orange County Investment Fund, 15 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 3, 3 (1995). 
199  Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. 
ON REG. 55, 70–72 (2016). 
200  We chose these states because they have a relatively broad statute, allowing both a class 
and a derivative type of taxpayer actions. 
201  A summary of all cases we read in six states—New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Arizona, Ar-
kansas and Illinois—is available on request from the author. 
202  See 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 11, § 52:18 (“Although a suit for an injunction is the usu-
al form of a taxpayer’s proceeding, other proceedings and forms of action are also com-
mon.”); Parsons, supra note 127, at 965 (“The remedy most commonly sought by state and 
local taxpayers is the injunction.”); Taxpayers’ Suits: A Survey and Summary, supra note 
117, at 907 (“The most usual relief is the injunction.”). 
18 NEV. L.J. 657, KIMHI - FINAL 5/30/18  11:55 AM 
686 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:657 
In some states, like Kansas or Massachusetts, this phenomenon can be at-
tributed to the state’s legislature.203 The language of the Taxpayer Statutes lim-
its the available remedies,204 and courts follow the statute language and deny 
other forms of recovery.205 In other states, the court itself, rather than the legis-
lature, limits the available remedies. In Maine, for example, courts distinguish 
between preventative-taxpayer suits and remedial-taxpayer suits.206 Whereas 
they allow preventative suits, remedial suits will be denied unless the plaintiff 
shows a particular damage not shared by the community.207 The same logic ap-
plies in Louisiana. In Alliance for Affordable Energy v. The Council of the City 
of New Orleans, the Louisiana court placed obstacles in the way of taxpayers 
seeking to compel a local action when compared to taxpayers seeking injunc-
tion.208 The court determined that, whereas a taxpayer seeking to compel an ac-
tion is rejected “absent a showing of some special interest which is separate and 
distinct from the interest of the public at large,” a taxpayer seeking to restrain 
an unlawful action is not required to demonstrate a special or particular interest 
and a “mere showing of an interest, however small and indeterminable” will 
suffice.209 
                                                        
203  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-907 (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 53 (2017). 
204  In Texas, the statute allows both injunction and mandamus, and the courts refused to al-
low monetary relief. See Burks v. Yarbrough, 157 S.W.3d 876, 880–81 (Tex. 2005). 
205  A broad interpretation of the available remedies in taxpayer actions, however, is not im-
possible. In California, for example, the statute’s language allows only for restraining and 
preventing illegal or wasteful local actions, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (2017), but the 
courts determined that the statute “does not  . . forbid a taxpayer from seeking to recover, on 
behalf of his municipality, the same moneys if illegally expended.” See Osburn v. Stone, 150 
P. 367, 368 (Cal. 1915). 
206  See Lehigh v. Pittston Co., 456 A.2d 355, 358 (Me. 1983). 
207  Id. (“The preventative-remedial dichotomy is the heart of a long-established doctrine 
which governs the standing of taxpayers to sue the municipalities in which they reside. In 
substance, this doctrine operates to exempt taxpayers who seek ‘preventative’ relief from the 
general rule that standing must be predicated on particularized injury. In contrast, taxpayers 
who seek ‘remedial relief’ are required to show special or particularized injury: injury differ-
ent from that incurred by every other taxpayer.”); see also 1 STEVENSON & VAN WIE, supra 
note 59, § 73.04. 
208  All. for Affordable Energy v. Council of New Orleans, 677 So. 2d 424, 428 (La. 1996). 
209  Id. 
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But even in states that explicitly allow remedial monetary damages, tax-
payer suits are mostly for injunction or declaratory relief. New York’s Taxpay-
er Statute, for example, allows taxpayers to sue a local authority or its officials 
to “restore and make good, any property, funds or estate of such . . . municipal 
corporation,”210 and yet relatively few monetary suits are filed. Out of 117 tax-
payer cases (since 1990), only thirty-eight were for pecuniary damages (the 
vast majority were for damages in addition to other non-monetary remedies). 
Out of these thirty-eight cases, the court affirmed the monetary claim in only 
three cases, and the rest were rejected outright or the plaintiffs were only given 
a non-monetary remedy. In Ohio, the Revised Code allows for monetary tax-
payer suits,211 but taxpayers seldom take advantage of this opportunity. Section 
5705.45 is hardly utilized at all,212 and under Section 733.59, only four suits 
(out of more than one hundred) were for pecuniary damages. The same is true 
in Arkansas, where monetary suits account for 25 percent of the cases, and in 
Arizona, where no taxpayer suits for monetary relief were filed (although the 
Arizona statute expressly allows such remedy).213 Oklahoma is the only state 
we found where the majority of taxpayer suits are for monetary relief, the 
courts rejected all claims, so, in effect, no taxpayer suits were accepted.214 
The reasons why taxpayers are not pursuing monetary claims (when avail-
able) are, of course, not stated in the courts’ opinions, but difficulties in as-
sessing the damages seem to play a role. As opposed to commercial corpora-
tions, municipal corporations do not have a monetary value, and that makes it 
difficult to quantify the taxpayers’ loss from a given local activity and to what 
extent they should be compensated.215 Plaintiffs, therefore, prefer to correct the 
public wrong—they enjoin the action or enforce performance, rather than seek 
some vague pecuniary claim. In addition, it seems that in taxpayer suits, as op-
posed to class and derivative actions, plaintiffs are not in it for the money. The 
suits are initiated by benevolent residents wishing to improve the quality of life 
in their locality, rather than by plaintiffs (or lawyers) wishing to make a prof-
                                                        
210  N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 51 (McKinney 2017). 
211  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5705.45 (West 2017) (“Any officer, employee . . . who expends 
or authorizes the expenditure . . . of any public funds on any such void contract, obligation, 
or order . . . shall be liable to the political subdivision for the full amount paid from the funds 
of the subdivision on any such order, contract, or obligation. . . . If the prosecuting attor-
ney . . . of the subdivision fails, upon the written request of any taxpayer, to institute action 
for the enforcement of the liability, the taxpayer may institute suit in his own name in behalf 
of the subdivision.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 733.59 (West 2017) (“If the village solicitor 
or city director of law fails, upon the written request of any taxpayer of the municipal corpo-
ration, to make any application provided for in sections 733.56 to 733.58 of the Revised 
Code, the taxpayer may institute suit in his own name, on behalf of the municipal corpora-
tion.”). 
212  Since 1990, the section is cited in Lexis-Nexis only six times. 
213  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-213 (West 2017). The data on all states in available with 
the author. 
214  The data on all states is available with the author. 
215  Cf. Kimhi, supra note 60, at 357–58. 
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it.216 Hence, in many cases, an injunction or writ of mandamus is sought, with-
out the need for monetary compensation. 
2. The Courts’ Attitude Towards Taxpayer Suits 
Another important aspect to note is the courts’ attitude towards taxpayer 
suits. Although the majority of state courts recognize taxpayer suits’ potential 
value, many still tend to treat them with suspicion. Contrary to the rhetoric they 
use, courts restrict the taxpayer actions, disincentivizing potential plaintiffs 
from initiating litigation. This approach is manifested in three different ways: 
standing requirements, narrow interpretation of Taxpayer Statutes, and reluc-
tance to award attorney’s fees. 
Although, as explained earlier, almost all state courts grant standing to lo-
cal taxpayers, some place restrictions on taxpayers’ ability to have their day in 
court. Florida courts, for example, still follow what is referred to as the Rick-
man Rule, promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court in 1917.217 According to 
the Rickman Rule, unless the plaintiff’s case rests on constitutional grounds 
based directly on the legislature’s taxing and spending power, she must show a 
particular damage to obtain standing.218 The plaintiff’s damage must be particu-
lar in kind, not only greater in degree, and must be traceable to the defendant’s 
actions.219 Likewise, the Michigan courts follow a “prudential approach,”220 
that the plaintiff must show a specific legal cause of action provided under law 
to obtain standing, and if such cause of action does not exist, the plaintiff needs 
to demonstrate a specific injury, right, or substantial interest.221 The same is 
true in Utah, where Courts grant standing “where matters of great public inter-
est and societal impact are concerned,”222 and only when the issue is “not more 
appropriately addressed by another branch of government pursuant to the polit-
ical process.”223 Even more extreme is a Kansas court, that determined taxpay-
ers cannot challenge the acts of public officials unless “they suffered some pe-
culiar personal injury separate and apart from all other taxpayers of the city 
alike.”224 Naturally, this Kansas requirement renders the taxpayer action a dead 
                                                        
216  See discussion infra Section III(C). 
217  Rickman v. Whitehurst, 74 So. 205, 207 (Fla. 1917). 
218  Dep’t of Admin. v. Horne, 269 So. 2d 659, 662 (Fla. 1972). 
219  55 FLA. JUR. 2D Taxpayers’ Actions §§ 4, 7 (2017). 
220  Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 699 (Mich. 2010). 
221  See id.; Kenneth Charette, Standing Alone?: The Michigan Supreme Court, the Lansing 
Decision, and the Liberalization of the Standing Doctrine, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 199, 206 
(2011). 
222  Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1978). 
223  Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1110 (Utah 2013); Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club 
v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960, 973 (Utah 2006). 
224  See Edgington v. City of Overland Park, 815 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Kan. 1991) (“While a pri-
vate citizen cannot attack the very existence of a city, the law does not preclude an attack on 
the internal organization of the city’s government. Thus, an individual may have standing if 
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letter, and even when accepted, it is not a taxpayer suit in the sense we use in 
the article (that results in a public, rather than personal benefit).225 
A second indication of the courts’ apprehension of taxpayer suits is their 
interpretation of the Taxpayer Statutes’ language. Here, New York provides a 
good example. The New York Taxpayer Statute allows local taxpayers to take 
action against a local authority, its officers or a third party “to prevent any ille-
gal official act . . . , or to prevent waste or injury . . . ” (emphasis added).226 But 
although the statute clearly offers two alternative causes of action—illegal ac-
tion or waste or injury—courts required these causes of action to be cumula-
tive.227 In Murtha v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, for example, the court 
rejected a taxpayer action to prevent an unnecessary payment of legal fees, stat-
ing that even if the allegation of waste was correct, “the plaintiffs have failed to 
allege an illegal or ultra vires act.”228 Moreover, although the Statute’s lan-
guage expressly states “any illegal act,” New York courts determined that the 
mere illegality of a certain local action does not suffice. The court in Mesivta of 
Forest Hills Institute, Inc. v. City of New York explained that “failure to ob-
serve . . . statutory provisions does not constitute the fraud or illegality neces-
sary to support a taxpayer action,” and when the illegality is considered merely 
procedural the court will dismiss the claim.229 Thus, a claim alleging failure to 
provide proper public notices for the appropriation of a water district reserve 
                                                                                                                                 
he or she has a special interest other than that of the general public”); Fransham v. McDow-
ell, 451 P.2d 131, 135 (Kan. 1969). 
225  See 74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 10, § 11 (“Unless standing is conferred by statute, tax-
payers generally must show that they have suffered a particularized injury distinct from that 
suffered by the general public in order to have standing to challenge a government action or 
assert a public right. Further, the damage must be peculiar in kind and not merely greater in 
degree”). 
226  N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 51 (McKinney 2017). 
227  See Murtha v. Inc. Vill. of Island Park, 202 A.D.2d 650, 650 (N.Y. 1994) (“Although the 
statute itself is written in the disjunctive, apparently permitting a suit to prevent either an il-
legal act or waste, the controlling cases interpreting the statute have required that both ele-
ments be present”). The court in Murtha acknowledges that the statute’s language does not 
mandate the alleged “waste” to be illegal, but bound by prior case law, this is the chosen in-
terpretation. 
228  See id. at 651; see also Mesivta of Forest Hills Inst., Inc. v. City of New York, 448 
N.E.2d 1344, 1345 (N.Y. 1983) (“It is well established that a taxpayer action pursuant to sec-
tion 51 of the General Municipal Law lies ‘only when the acts complained of are fraudulent, 
or a waste of public property in the sense that they represent a use of public property or 
funds for entirely illegal purposes’ ”); Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. 
1953) (“The decisions under section 51 make it entirely clear that redress may be had only 
when the acts complained of are fraudulent, or a waste of public property in the sense that 
they represent a use of public property or funds for entirely illegal purposes”). 
229  Mesivta, 448 N.E.2d at 1345; 103 N.Y. JUR. 2D TAXPAYERS’ ACTIONS § 26 (2017) 
(“While the statute is remedial in nature and to be liberally construed for the protection of 
taxpayers, allegations of illegality alone are an insufficient basis for a taxpayer’s suit under 
the statute, and a taxpayer’s action under this provision is not a vehicle for correcting purely 
procedural irregularities by governmental bodies”). 
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fund,230 a claim asserting a failure to specify the reasons for reacquisition of a 
school building,231 and a motion to set aside an agreement that the local authori-
ty illegally entered232 were all rejected, despite the local authority’s proven ille-
gal actions, because the courts deemed the illegalities to be formalities and no 
fraud was proven. This narrow interpretation of the local Taxpayer Statute 
shows the courts’ lack of enthusiasm for local taxpayer suits, and their reluc-
tance to encourage taxpayers to sue.233 
Yet a third manifestation of this approach, and in our opinion the most im-
portant one, can be found in the willingness (or unwillingness) to grant attor-
ney’s fees. In order to explain the courts’ approach in this matter, and to better 
understand the effects this approach has on potential plaintiffs, we first discuss 
the rules for awarding attorney’s fees in general, and then the application of 
these rules in local taxpayer litigation. 
The general American rule concerning attorney’s fees is that each litigant 
is responsible for the compensation of her own attorney’s fees.234 Whether the 
claim is affirmed or rejected, both the plaintiff and the defendant pay their re-
spective attorneys’ costs.235 Under certain conditions this rule has various ex-
ceptions (statutory and equitable) that enable the court to award attorneys’ fees 
notwithstanding the American convention.236 The equitable exceptions that are 
potentially relevant to local taxpayer suits are threefold: the common fund doc-
trine, the common benefit doctrine, and the private attorney general doctrine.237 
The common fund doctrine allows the court to award attorney’s fees when 
a common fund that benefits a class of plaintiffs is created.238 In this case, 
courts use their equitable powers to determine that the attorneys’ fees be paid 
                                                        
230  Langdon v. Town of Webster, 270 A.D.2d 896, 897 (N.Y. 2000). 
231  Mesivta, 448 N.E.2d at 1345. 
232  Betters v. Knabel, 288 A.D.2d 872, 872 (N.Y. 2001). 
233  Council of New York v. Giuliani, 5 A.D.3d 330, 331 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (the court 
explained the Statute “is not a vehicle for correcting purely procedural irregularities by gov-
ernmental bodies.”). 
234  John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Ac-
cess to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1575 (1993). 
235  Id. 
236  See id. at 1578–90 (listing all exceptions); Layne Rouse, Note, Battling for Attorneys’ 
Fees: The Subtle Influence of “Conservatism” in 42 U.S.C. Section 1988, 59 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 973, 975 (2007). 
237  Lloyd C. Anderson, Equitable Power to Award Attorney’s Fees: The Seductive Appeal of 
“Benefit,” 48 S.D. L. REV. 217, 218–19 (2003). 
238  A common fund is a monetary fund from which others, besides a representative plaintiff, 
can benefit (i.e. an entire class of shareholders, a group of taxpayers, etc.). The rationale of 
the doctrine is to force all fund beneficiaries to share the costs of the litigation that created it. 
Courts use their equitable powers to determine that the attorney’s fees be paid out of the 
fund, thereby forcing the beneficiaries to pay their equitable share. The common fund doc-
trine is widely used and serves as a legal basis for paying the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees in 
commercial-class actions where the plaintiffs receive monetary relief. See Trustees v. 
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 534 (1881); Anderson, supra note 237, at 223; Vargo, supra note 
234, at 1579. 
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out of the created fund, thereby forcing the fund’s beneficiaries to pay their 
share of the litigation costs. The common benefit doctrine concerns a situation 
where a non-pecuniary benefit is conferred upon a class of beneficiaries that 
own, or are members of, the defendant.239 Here, although the benefit comes in 
the form of an injunction or a specific action, due to the plaintiffs’ stake in the 
defendant, the same logic applies. Forcing the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s 
attorney’s fees shifts the attorney’s fees to the class of beneficiaries, thereby 
preventing their unjust enrichment.240 The third doctrine—the private attorney 
general doctrine—has a different rationale.241 The rationale of this doctrine is to 
incentivize public-interest litigation by awarding attorney’s fees to parties that 
vindicate a right that benefits a large number of people and is of societal im-
portance.242 Courts acknowledge that public interest litigation may not be initi-
ated if the initiators are not compensated for their efforts, and the doctrine al-
lows them to reward benevolent plaintiffs for the public service they 
provided.243 
Most state courts, however, refuse to apply both the common benefit and 
private attorney general doctrines where local taxpayer suits are concerned. In-
stead, they are willing to deviate from the general American rule when the tax-
                                                        
239  The doctrine was developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite 
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396–97 (1970). See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9 (1973). 
240  Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 276 (1975) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); Anderson, supra note 237, at 223; Scott J. Jordan, Note, Awarding Attorney’s 
Fees to Environmental Plaintiffs Under a Private Attorney General Theory, 14 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 287, 294 (1987). 
241  Jordan, supra note 240, at 295. 
242  The different rationales of the common benefit and private attorney general doctrines ex-
plain their different applications. The public benefit doctrine applies only where the defend-
ant is owned by the class of plaintiffs (like in a commercial corporation), or in cases where 
the benefitted plaintiffs are members of the defendant (like in a union). In these cases, due to 
the benefitted class’s stake in the defendant, shifting the litigation costs to the defendant is 
the same as shifting the fees to the benefitted class. The defendant is the one paying the fees 
to the plaintiff, but since the benefitted class members own the defendant, in essence, they 
are the ones paying the fees. Jordan, supra note 240, at 294. The application of the private 
attorney general doctrine, on the other hand, does not require the plaintiff class members to 
own or be members of the defendant. Under this doctrine, the defendant pays the winning 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees when the litigation promotes an important public policy, and the 
court wishes to incentivize such litigation to advance the interests of the public. Thus, in the 
case of the private attorney general doctrine, the class of beneficiaries should not be small 
and easily ascertainable (but rather the public at large), and the plaintiffs do not necessarily 
own, or are members of, the defendant. Anderson, supra note 237, at 232. 
243  Ann K. Wooster, Private Attorney General Doctrine—State Cases, 106 A.L.R.5TH 523 
(2003). Note that the private attorney general doctrine was rejected by the Federal court sys-
tem. In Alyeska Pipeline, the Supreme Court determined that “it would be inappropriate for 
the Judiciary, without legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of litigation . . . ” 
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 247. As a response to Alyeska, Congress enacted 42 
U.S.C. § 1988(b), which allows the court to award attorney’s fees in cases arising under cer-
tain civil liberty litigations. State courts, however, are not bound by the Alyeska ruling. 
Awarding attorney’s fees is entirely a state law question, and California, for example, adopt-
ed the private attorney general doctrine despite the federal approach. 
18 NEV. L.J. 657, KIMHI - FINAL 5/30/18  11:55 AM 
692 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:657 
payer suit creates a common fund, but are reluctant to do so when a non-
pecuniary benefit is conferred.244 When there is no fund that the plaintiffs’ costs 
can be taken, courts are disinclined to tax the local treasury for the plaintiffs’ 
attorney’s fees, even when the local authority has wronged or the plaintiffs’ ac-
tion benefitted the local residents.245 The Tennessee Supreme Court explained 
this approach as follows: 
We know of no case holding or even intimating that, where counsel have by bill 
in equity enjoined illegal appropriations, the Court is authorized to declare lien 
upon the county treasury for attorney’s fees, or to order such fees paid as court 
costs, however meritorious the services may have been.246 
This approach is not only adopted in Tennessee, but in the majority of 
states, such as New York,247 New Jersey,248 Florida,249 Alabama,250 Indiana,251 
Connecticut,252 Illinois,253 Massachusetts,254 Michigan,255 Missouri,256 Missis-
sippi,257 Texas,258 and others,259 and creates a significant hurdle for taxpayer-
plaintiffs. As we have seen, most of the taxpayer suits are for injunctive, de-
claratory, or mandamus reliefs, and since a common fund is not created, plain-
tiffs’ attorney’s fees will rarely be awarded. In New York, for example, attor-
ney’s fees were not awarded (even when plaintiff won the claims submitted); in 
Ohio, attorney’s fees were awarded in 14 percent of the cases (although plain-
tiffs won 35 percent of the claims submitted), and in 6 percent of the cases in 
Arkansas (although plaintiffs won 25 percent of the actions).260 
                                                        
244  74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 10, § 80 (“Accordingly, where the taxpayer’s action seeks to 
prevent the illegal disbursement or collection of funds, in which no money is brought into 
the common fund, it has been held that attorney’s fees will not be awarded [sic] the com-
plainant even though the complainant’s act has rendered a great public service to the taxpay-
ers.”); see also 1 ROBERT L. ROSSI, ATTORNEYS’ FEES § 7:19 (3d ed. 2017) (“The view has 
also been taken that where the taxpayer’s objective is not to secure or preserve a common 
fund but to establish adverse interests therein, attorneys’ fees will not be awarded”). 
245  74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 10, § 80; Southern v. Beeler, 195 S.W.2d 857, 873 (Tenn. 
1946). 
246  Id. 
247  RACHEL M. KANE, 103 N.Y. JUR. 2D TAXPAYER ACTIONS § 78 (2d ed. 2017). 
248  MICHAEL A. PANE, 35A N.J. PRAC., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 29:17 (4th ed. 2017). 
249  COREY E. BURNHAM-HOWARD, 55 FLA. JUR. 2D TAXPAYERS’ ACTIONS § 45 (2d ed. 2017). 
250  Shelby Cty. Comm’n v. Smith, 372 So. 2d 1092, 1096–97 (Ala. 1979); Ellison v. Green, 
775 So. 2d 831, 835 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000). 
251  State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Town of St. John, 751 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Ind. 2001). 
252  Doe v. State, 579 A.2d 37, 48–49 (Conn. 1990). 
253  Hamer v. Kirk, 356 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ill. 1976). 
254  Pearson v. Bd. of Health of Chicopee, 525 N.E.2d 400, 402 (Mass. 1988). 
255  Nemeth v. Abonmarche Dev., Inc., 576 N.W.2d 641, 651–53 (Mich. 1998). 
256  Moore v. City of Pacific, 534 S.W.2d 486, 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
257  Fordice v. Thomas, 649 So. 2d 835, 846 (Miss. 1995). 
258  In re Interest of S.J.O.B.G., 292 S.W.3d 764, 786–87 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009). 
259  Wooster, supra note 243, § 3(b); Parsons, supra note 127, at 977. 
260  Data is available with author. 
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Some courts are even reluctant to award attorney’s fees to prevailing plain-
tiffs when their Taxpayer Statute expressly authorizes them to do so. In Arizo-
na, for example, the Statute states that “[i]f the taxpayer prevails in the action, 
the court shall allow him costs and reasonable attorney’s fees,”261 but the Ari-
zona court awarded attorney’s fees in only three actions (out of ten that were 
filed, and six where plaintiffs prevailed).262 In Oklahoma, the Statute provides 
that the “county, city, town or school district shall be liable to the resident tax-
payer . . . for reasonable attorney fees,”263 and yet since 1990, attorney’s fees 
have not been awarded even once.264 In California, the state legislature express-
ly adopted the private attorney general doctrine. In California, the Code of Civil 
Procedure allows the court,265 under certain conditions, to award attorneys’ fees 
in actions that have benefitted the public, and yet courts rarely use this authori-
ty in taxpayer suits.266 In most taxpayer suits, courts do not award attorneys’ 
fees, and plaintiffs finance the litigation themselves. 
C. The Scarcity of Local-Taxpayer Suits Explained 
We can now close the circle and explain the scarcity of local-taxpayer 
suits, especially in comparison to commercial class and derivative litigation. 
The reasons for this phenomenon, we believe, are twofold: first, it is much 
more difficult to initiate private enforcement action in the public sphere than in 
the commercial sphere; second, when initiated, the chances of the representa-
tive plaintiff to recover the costs of litigation, including attorney’s fees, are 
much lower. 
The first reason—the relative difficulty of initiating taxpayer litigation—
concerns the amount of information available to potential plaintiffs.267 In the 
commercial sphere, corporations are obligated by securities laws to disclose all 
relevant information about their activities.268 They must reveal their transac-
tions, risk factors, corporate events, etc., and all this information is readily 
available to potential plaintiffs. In addition, adverse corporate events are often 
reflected in corporate share prices.269 The decrease in share price signals the ex-
istence of a potential cause of action, and also indicates the amount of damages 
plaintiffs can receive. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, therefore, need only to follow the 
                                                        
261  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-213(C) (2017). 
262  Data is available with author. 
263  OKLA. STAT. tit. 62, § 373 (2017). 
264  Data is available with author. 
265  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 2017). 
266  Data is available with author. 
267  See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012). 
268  John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 717 n.2 (1984). 
269  Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and 
Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 770–72 (1985). 
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capital markets in order to detect cases in which they believe the potential dam-
ages justify the work they need to put in.270 Unfortunately, though, these mech-
anisms are not available in the local sphere. First, municipal corporations, even 
those that issue municipal bonds, are exempt from many of the obligations un-
der the Securities law.271 As a result, local disclosure is basic and insufficient,272 
and local authorities are significantly less transparent than their commercial 
peers.273 Second, the way the information is revealed to the public is lacking. 
Local governments’ websites tend to hide adverse information,274 and until 
2008, there was not even a central place (website) to find all municipal disclo-
sures.275 Third, since local governments do not issue shares, there is no visible 
decrease in the “value” of a locality. The damage caused to local taxpayers 
from a certain local action is not easily discernable, and plaintiffs’ lawyers can 
hardly assess whether the gains from a potential claim are worth their invest-
ment.276 
These problems could have been mitigated if courts were receptive to local 
taxpayer suits—but, unfortunately, this is not the case. As we have seen, courts 
place hurdles upon taxpayer suits, and discourage potential litigants from act-
ing. 
The special standing requirements and narrow interpretation of Taxpayer 
Statutes decrease the plaintiffs’ chances of winning taxpayer suits. This, in turn, 
decreases the chances of recovery, and thereby the motivation to initiate action 
in the first place. More importantly, even if the representative plaintiffs are suc-
cessful in their claim (and even if they benefit the public), courts are reluctant 
to award them attorney’s fees. Usually, Plaintiffs are forced to bear the costs of 
the litigation that tends to outweigh their potential benefits. Thus, the suits are 
initiated by a few benevolent plaintiffs acting for the good of the public. 
                                                        
270  Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, 
Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 22 (1994). 
271  Gabaldon, supra note 25, at 742–53. 
272  There are no mandatory specifics as to the content of the disclosure, and the disclosure 
need not be preregistered. Shanske, supra note 25, at 802–03. 
273  David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 721 (2012) (“The state 
and municipal debt markets provide considerably less disclosure to investors than the mar-
kets for corporate bonds. Not only are state and municipal budgets more opaque than the 
balance sheets of most corporations (though large financial institutions come close); inves-
tors also have less access to current price data than with other bonds.”); see also Maggie 
Guidotti, Seeking “the SEC’s Full Protection”: A Critique of the New Frontier in Municipal 
Securities Enforcement, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 2045, 2045 (2015). 
274  Cory L. Armstrong, Providing a Clearer View: An Examination of Transparency on Lo-
cal Government Websites, 28 GOV’T INFO. Q. 11, 11 (2011). 
275  In 2008, the Electronic Municipal Market Access System was established, serving as the 
official source for municipal securities disclosure. 
276  Although many local governments issue municipal bonds, bond prices are not as good 
indicators as are shares for identifying potential causes of action for taxpayer suits. Adverse 
events in the locality will affect bond prices only to the extent that they change the munici-
pality’s ability to repay its debts, but many events adversely affect taxpayers without having 
any influence on bondholders. 
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In addition, the fact that attorney’s fees are so seldomly awarded abolishes 
the entrepreneurial aspect of taxpayer suits. In the commercial sphere, plain-
tiffs’ lawyers are the initiators of the litigation.277 If the action is successful, the 
lawyers get their share of the entire class’s gains, so it is worth their while to 
find a cause of action and a client that best fits the prospective litigation.278 
Lawyers, therefore, monitor commercial corporations, look for breaches of fi-
duciary duties or securities frauds, and take action when appropriate. As Judge 
Zagel pointed out in Williams v. Balcor Pension Investors:279 
In truth, class actions are inevitably the child of the lawyer rather than the cli-
ent . . . There are cases in which lawyers find clients and precipitate cases where 
perhaps no one client would ever come forward to complain. I suppose lawyers 
going out to find clients is not the bad thing it was once thought to be. 
But in the public sphere, lawyers have no reason to act in the same manner. 
Attorney’s fees are not granted by the courts, and so lawyers have no motiva-
tion to go out and find clients. Lawyers, in this respect, act as businessmen. If 
adequately compensated, they will be willing to monitor local governments 
(just as they do commercial corporations), and propel litigation that can poten-
tially improve local governance. But without fees, they will not oversee local 
officials’ behavior, and will hardly investigate waste or possible corruption. 
They have little incentive to invest multiple hours in researching for a cause of 
action or spend the required resources to prepare a case. 
This analysis shows why, despite their declared purpose and great poten-
tial,280 taxpayer suits do not serve as an effective monitoring tool. The legal 
system does not motivate private lawyers to act, and so it fails to take ad-
vantage of an army of private attorneys eager to monitor local authorities for 
profit. That leaves the monitoring to a few benevolent residents that suffer from 
collective action problems and can hardly do a proper job. In the following sec-
tion, we try to explore the reasons for this legal approach. We examine the ar-
guments given in its favor, and whether they justify the scarce use of taxpayer 
suits. 
IV. A NORMATIVE EVALUATION OF LOCAL TAXPAYER SUITS—CRITIQUES AND 
REFORMS 
So far, our analysis has been positive in nature. We saw that the number of 
local-taxpayer suits is relatively small, and discussed possible reasons for their 
scarce filing. Yet, it is not entirely clear that the small number of taxpayer suits 
                                                        
277  Macey & Miller, supra note 79, at 7. 
278  Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 92, at 2060. Weiss & Beckerman report that in a large 
number of class actions, the plaintiffs themselves are “poorly informed about the theories of 
their cases, are totally ignorant of the facts, or are illiterate concerning financial matters.” 
279  Williams v. Balcor Pension Inv’rs, 150 F.R.D. 109, 118 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
280  Theurer v. Borrone, 195 A.2d 215, 216 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1963); 1 STEVENSON & 
VAN WIE, supra note 59, § 73.04. 
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is problematic. Perhaps the current state of affairs is desirable. Perhaps too 
many taxpayer suits are liable to waste judicial time and government resources. 
The concern about an increase in the number of taxpayer suits stems from 
critiques often raised about class and derivative actions. In the commercial 
sphere, many believe that there are far too many actions being filed, rendering 
them inefficient and costly.281 The actions force corporations to spend millions 
in legal expenses that are then passed on to consumers.282 The same can be said 
about taxpayer suits: A flood of taxpayer suits may force localities to increase 
legal costs, thereby rendering local services more expensive. In addition, local 
officials may fear the potential litigation, and act defensively to avoid lawsuits 
instead of acting in accordance with what they believe is best for the locality. If 
this is the case, perhaps few taxpayer suits are better for the public. 
In order to normatively analyze the desirability of local taxpayer suits, in 
this section we examine three types of critiques. First, we look at the separation 
of powers doctrine, then examine the flood of litigation argument, and lastly—
analyze whether taxpayers (like shareholders) indeed benefit from the litiga-
tion. Addressing these critiques will enable us to examine whether the use of 
local taxpayer suits should be broadened, and if so—how. 
A. Separation of Powers 
The first argument raised against taxpayer suits is that of the doctrine of 
separation of powers.283 This doctrine deals with the relationship among the 
three branches of government, and prohibits each branch from interfering with 
the work of the others.284 The judiciary claims the doctrine should address par-
                                                        
281  Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit 
in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 261–63 
(1986); Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Inter-
section of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 71 (2003); Coffee, 
supra note 89, at 671–72. 
282  See Buford v. Am. Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1251 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (“This is an ap-
propriate moment for the court to express its grave concern over the increasing resort to the 
class action device in actions seeking monetary relief. The class action is supposed to 
‘achieve economies of time, effort and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to 
persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other 
undesirable results.’ Today, however, many claims which simply did not exist have been 
brought to life by our courts through the judicial act of allowing a class action to be main-
tained. . . . . [T]he plain truth is that in many cases Rule 23(b)(3) is being used as a device for 
the solicitation of litigation. This is clearly an ‘undesirable result’ which cannot be tolerat-
ed.”). 
283  Staudt, supra note 34, at 784–85. 
284  For a more elaborate discussion of the separation of powers doctrine, see Bruce G. Pea-
body & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers, 53 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (2003). 
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ticular injuries suffered by certain plaintiffs, while taxpayer suits concern pub-
lic injuries that are political in nature.285 
In the federal courts, the doctrine of separation of powers is one of the 
main reasons for rejecting federal and state taxpayer suits.286 The Supreme 
Court determined that the “general grievances” in these types of cases (griev-
ances not particular to any taxpayer), should be decided by the political system, 
and denied plaintiffs the opportunity to stand before the judiciary.287 In state 
courts, although standing is not denied, due to separation of powers concerns, 
certain courts place limitations on taxpayer suits. In Utah, for example, the 
court grants standing “where matters of great public interest and societal impact 
are concerned,”288 and only where the issue is “not more appropriately ad-
dressed by another branch of government pursuant to the political process.”289 
New York’s narrow interpretation of the local taxpayer action statute also 
draws on, at least in part, the separation of powers doctrine. In the case of Mon-
tecalvo v. Herbowy, the New York court denied the availability of a damage 
action, explaining that allowing that the “[t]axpayer resort to the judiciary im-
plicates serious separation of powers concerns.”290 
These ‘separation of powers’ concerns, however, seem excessive to us. 
They do not derive from the doctrine as we interpret it, and do not conform to 
the usual scope of judicial review on local governments. The doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers stops courts from replacing the discretion of the legislative or 
executive branches. According to the doctrine, courts should decide the cases 
presented before them rather than make general policy decisions or second-
                                                        
285  Taxpayers’ Suits: A Survey and Summary, supra note 117, at 910; Jay M. Zitter, Consti-
tutionality, Construction, and Application of Statutes Requiring Bond or Other Security in 
Taxpayers’ Action, 41 A.L.R.5TH 47 (1996). 
286  Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN L. REV. 459, 459 (2008). 
287  Id. at 476; see, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 
(1974). In this case, an association comprised of former and present armed forces reserves 
members challenged the membership of some congressmen in the reserves as being a viola-
tion of the Constitution’s incompatibility clause. The Supreme Court rejected a taxpayer 
claim on grounds of standing, explaining that to allow such a claim would “distort the role of 
the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and open the Judiciary 
to an arguable charge of providing ‘government by injunction.’ ” Id. at 222 (emphasis add-
ed); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881 (1983). 
288  Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1978). 
289  Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960, 973 (Utah 2006); 
Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1110 (Utah 2013). 
290  Montecalvo v. Herbowy, 656 N.Y.S.2d 176, 178–79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (“Taxpayer 
resort to the judiciary implicates serious separation of powers concerns . . . The republican 
form of government contemplates separate spheres of governmental competence with an 
elaborate system of checks and balances to remedy abuses. While democratic innovations 
have led to a much broader role for taxpayers as participants in governance, the availability 
of damage actions as a check on official misconduct is still sharply limited. To empower 
taxpayer litigants disenfranchises the voters for whom representatives legislate”). 
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guess the wisdom of statutes.291 However, the doctrine does not instruct the ju-
diciary to refrain from determining whether the decisions or actions of the ex-
ecutive or legislature comply with the constitution or rule of law. On the con-
trary: when other branches of government act absent proper legal authority or 
use improper legal procedures, it is the role of the judiciary to proclaim such 
illegality.292 As Richard Epstein noted, a strong separationist approach is incon-
sistent with the principles of judicial review as determined in Marbury v. Madi-
son.293 In Marbury, Justice Marshall determined that “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” and when 
the executive and legislature do not comply with the rule of law, the judiciary is 
called upon to intervene.294 
This is especially true when the judicial review concerns local govern-
ments. According to local government law, local governments are creatures 
(subdivisions) of the state.295 Courts constantly examine whether localities’ ac-
tions are within the powers delegated to them by the state, and whether their 
decisions follow their own local ordinances and procedures.296 Since, generally, 
local actions are under judicial review, we see no reason why separation of 
powers concerns should play a major role in taxpayer suits. If courts are any-
way less apprehensive when scrutinizing local legislatures or executives (as 
compared to their review of state and federal legislatures and executives), they 
should not be concerned when doing so also in the framework of taxpayer suits. 
Even the Supreme Court allowed local taxpayer suits in the federal court sys-
tem, despite separation of powers concerns,297 and we see no reason why state 
courts should decide differently. 
                                                        
291  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Matthew James 
Tanielian, Note, Separation of Powers and the Supreme Court: One Doctrine, Two Visions, 
8 ADMIN. L.J. 961, 961 (1995). 
292  Epstein, supra note 115, at 35–36. 
293  See id. (“It all sounds good until we realize that this strong separationist sentiment is flat-
ly inconsistent with judicial review under Marbury v. Madison, for the complaint here is not 
that the law is unwise, but that it lies beyond the power of Congress to enact.”); see also 
Mark C. Rahdert, Forks Taken and Roads Not Taken: Standing to Challenge Faith-Based 
Spending, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1009, 1054 (2011) (“Consequently, the rule-of-law dimen-
sions of Marbury not only support, but actually call for the judiciary to decide, and separa-
tion of powers issues are beside the point. This is, quintessentially, a matter for judicial de-
termination.”). 
294  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803) (emphasis added). 
295  Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907); Frug, supra note 59, at 1080–
1120; Gillette, supra note 37, 963–68. 
296  See Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review in Local Government Law: A Reappraisal, 60 
MINN. L. REV. 669, 669 (1976). Bruff divides the judicial review of local governments into 
three main categories: first, since local governments’ powers are delegated to them by the 
state, courts examine whether the delegating statutes are constitutionally valid; second, 
courts examine whether the local decisions or actions are within the confines of the delegat-
ing statute; and third, courts verify that the local decisions or actions are conducted pursuant 
the locality’s own local ordinance. 
297  Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 605 (1989). 
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B. A Flood of Litigation 
A second concern about broadening taxpayer suits is, therefore, that open-
ing the judiciary’s gate too wide will bring in a flood of litigation that will dis-
rupt both courts and local governments. According to the argument, too many 
taxpayer actions will not only cause court congestion, but will also delay or 
even halt public projects. Managing taxpayer suits will waste local officials’ 
time and resources, and ex-ante officials are liable to behave defensively and 
bury complicated projects out of fear of litigation.298 This concern is strongly 
echoed in the opinions of both federal299 and state courts,300 as a reason to limit, 
albeit not to reject, taxpayer actions. 
But although this concern is valid, we believe it is exaggerated. As dis-
cussed earlier—contrary to commercial litigation in the public sphere—the in-
vestment required to initiate litigation is relatively high due to information gaps 
and difficulty in quantifying the damage to taxpayers.301 As a result, even if the 
limits on local-taxpayer suits were lifted (and, most importantly, even if attor-
neys’ fees were awarded to all successful plaintiffs), we would not expect a 
flood of litigation. The barriers potential plaintiffs (and plaintiffs’ lawyers) face 
when filing a taxpayer suit are high enough as is, and it seems that additional 
judicial hurdles are not required to limit the number of suits. 
This is especially true if, as we will suggest in the following part, the judi-
cial review in taxpayer suits was limited to the local actions’ legality or proce-
dure. We presume most local decisions are legal and procedurally proper, and, 
therefore, a flood of litigation should not be expected. But even if we are 
wrong, and taxpayer-plaintiffs will start flooding the courts, it only means that 
the court’s intervention is warranted. It is the courts’ duty to remedy illegal or 
procedurally flawed decisions so that local governments and officials will cor-
rect their ways in the future—this is the meaning of monitoring. 
                                                        
298  Taxpayers’ Suits: A Survey and Summary, supra note 117, at 909–10. 
299  See Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Frothingham) v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484–87 
(1923) (“If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other taxpayer 
may do the same, not only in respect of the statute here under review, but also in respect of 
every other appropriation act and statute whose administration requires the outlay of public 
money, and whose validity may be questioned. The bare suggestion of such a result, with its 
attendant inconveniences, goes far to sustain the conclusion which we have reached, that a 
suit of this character cannot be maintained.”). 
300  See Taxpayers’ Suits: A Survey and Summary, supra note 117, at 910 n.83 (“The fear of a 
multiplicity of litigation has been one of the most common criticisms levelled at taxpayers’ 
actions.”); see also Chiatello v. City and County of San Francisco, 189 Cal. App. 4th 472, 
472 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Ceres v. Modesto, 274 Cal. App. 2d 545, 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1969); Mesivta of Forest Hills Ins., Inc. v. New York, 448 N.E.2d 1344, 1345 (N.Y. 1983); 
Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome County, 18 N.Y. 155, 155 (N.Y. 1858). 
301  See supra text accompanying notes 267–76. 
18 NEV. L.J. 657, KIMHI - FINAL 5/30/18  11:55 AM 
700 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:657 
C. Who Benefits from Allowing Taxpayer Suits? 
This brings us to the final critique on taxpayer suits—that the benefit tax-
payers derive from these actions is, in fact, small or even non-existent. This cri-
tique was not voiced in connection to taxpayer suits, but rather with respect to a 
segment of commercial class-action suits—securities class actions, but it is very 
relevant nonetheless.302 In order to better explain the critique and its relevance 
to local-taxpayer suits, we first take a look at the gains (or lack thereof) share-
holders derive from securities class actions, and then analyze the implications 
for residents in local-taxpayer suits. 
A securities class action is filed on behalf of investors who suffered dam-
ages as a result of a securities law violation. A corporation publishes a mislead-
ing statement or fails to disclose a material fact, and, as a result, investors buy 
the corporation’s shares at a higher price than they would have otherwise (had 
the corporation revealed more accurate statements).303 De jure, the class action 
is designed to compensate shareholders for the excess amount they paid due to 
the misleading information, but de facto, it is not entirely clear that sharehold-
ers actually benefit from these suits. As John Coffee pointed out, on average, 
securities class actions do not enrich shareholders, and may even cause them 
losses due to high transaction costs.304 
To understand Coffee’s observation, we need to examine the parties in-
volved in a securities class action. The plaintiffs’ group in such actions consists 
of investors who purchased the corporation’s securities from the time the mis-
leading statement was revealed to the time corrective disclosure was made 
(hereinafter referred to as the “Class Action Period”).305 The defendants in the-
se actions are those responsible for the misleading statements, usually both the 
corporation and some of its directors and officers (like the CEO or CFO). In 
most cases, however, the corporation is the only one to pay damages. The indi-
vidual directors and officers are either insured or indemnified by the corpora-
tion,306 and so, even if they are responsible for the securities violation, nothing 
will come out of their own pockets.307 
Since the corporation is the only one paying, a securities class action essen-
tially transfers wealth between two groups of shareholders. The transferring 
group is the current shareholders. As residual owners, they bear the cost of the 
payment, because when the corporation pays, the value of their shares in the 
                                                        
302  John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and 
Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1534 (2006). 
303  Greg Niehaus & Greg Roth, Insider Trading, Equity Issues, and CEO Turnover in Firms 
Subject to Securities Class Action, 28 FIN. MGMT. 52, 52–54 (1999). 
304  Coffee, supra note 302, at 1536–37. 
305  Niehaus & Roth, supra note 303, at 54. 
306  Note that in both cases involving indemnification or insurance, the corporation is the one 
paying the damages, either as indemnification to the insiders or as premiums to the insurance 
company. 
307  Coffee, supra note 302, at 1550–51. 
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corporation decreases accordingly. The receiving group is the shareholders who 
bought their shares during the Class Action Period. They are the members of 
the plaintiffs’ class, and as such, they are entitled to compensation for the mis-
leading disclosures. In many cases, however, shareholders belong to both 
shareholder groups—the paying one and the receiving one.308 If, for example, a 
shareholder bought her shares within the Class Action Period and continues to 
hold the shares after corrective disclosure is made, she both receives damages 
and pays them. As a current shareholder, she suffers the loss when the corpora-
tion pays, but as a member of the plaintiffs’ group, she gains the damages paid. 
This also occurs when shareholders have a diversified portfolio (they buy and 
sell shares in multiple corporations). These shareholders will sometimes pay 
damages (as current shareholders) and sometimes receive them (as members of 
the plaintiffs’ class). There is no reason to believe they will be on the receiving 
end more than on the paying end, or vice versa, and, on average, they will 
therefore transfer wealth to themselves.309 
This self-transfer, albeit futile, would not have been so problematic had it 
not been associated with transaction costs. Because the transfer requires the 
payment of attorneys’ fees, these eventually come out of the shareholders’ 
pockets. The fees can amount to a substantial percentage of the awarded dam-
ages (often 20–30 percent), and they are paid out of the created fund.310 Thus, 
in cases where there is a circular wealth transfer, on the paying end, sharehold-
ers lose the entire amount of the award, but on the receiving end, they receive 
only a fraction of the award (the award minus litigation costs). Thus, on aver-
age, the shareholders can be net losers, and be better off without the costly liti-
gation initiated by the plaintiffs’ lawyers. 
This argument can also be applied to taxpayer suits. Like in the commer-
cial sphere, if the municipality is the only one paying the taxpayer damages, 
taxpayer suits seemingly transfer wealth from the residents to themselves. The 
current residents bear the costs associated with the payment to the plaintiffs, 
while the plaintiffs—who were residents at the time of the misconduct—benefit 
from the awarded compensation. Since most of the residents at the time of the 
misconduct are likely to continue living in the locality, it seems that they trans-
fer wealth to themselves. What they gain as plaintiffs, they lose as residents, 
but, once again, less the costs of litigation. The litigation brings them no bene-
fit, but they still need to pay attorney’s fees. If this is the case, surely taxpayer 
suits should not be encouraged, and it may be argued that the limitations placed 
by the courts are justified. 
But this argument, albeit appealing, is not entirely accurate. There are im-
portant differences between shareholders and taxpayers, and some of these dif-
ferences affect the benefits of each type of procedure. In the commercial 
                                                        
308  Id. at 1556. 
309  Id. at 1556–66. 
310  Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 95, at 250. 
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sphere, the dispersed shareholders are very much alike. They all hold the same 
rights vis-à-vis the corporation, and they all have access to the same infor-
mation.311 If the corporation incurs unnecessary expenses, all shares suffer the 
same loss, and if the corporation discloses incorrect information, all public 
shareholders are misled.312 Due to this equality, chances are high that what 
plaintiffs gain as damages, they lose as shareholders, and that the class actions 
will result in net losses. This is not the case with regard to local governments. 
In a local government, the residents are a diverse group. As opposed to share-
holders, whose common goal is to maximize their shares’ value, residents ex-
pect different things from their local government and consume diverse local 
goods and services. Some residents are individuals, while others are businesses; 
some enjoy the education system, while others prefer parks and recreation.313 In 
addition, as opposed to shareholders, residents pay different amounts to the lo-
cal government (not simply the share price). Tax rates often differ among resi-
dents according to their place of residence or socio-economic status, and differ-
ent residents pay different types of special assessments and user fees according 
to the goods and services they consume from the locality.314 In other words, 
there are many groups of residents in the locality, and taxpayer suits often con-
cern the grievances of one group of residents rather than of others. 
When the plaintiffs in the taxpayer action comprise a subset of the local 
residents (one group of residents), we cannot say that the plaintiffs transfer 
wealth to themselves. Rather, all residents in the locality pay the awarded dam-
ages, while only one group (the plaintiffs) receives the compensation. For ex-
ample, a locality with 500,000 residents, where 20 percent of the residents (the 
“Group”) pays a total of one million dollars in excess due to an illegally levied 
tax (or user fee). Without a taxpayer action, the Group loses a net of $800,000 
due to the illegal tax. The Group pays one million dollars to the locality (the 
illegal tax), but assuming the locality spends the proceeds of the illegal tax 
evenly among all its residents,315 the Group enjoys 20 percent ($200,000) of the 
benefit.316 A taxpayer suit can offset this loss: If the Group wins the suit, the 
                                                        
311  George Jarvis Thompson, Respective Rights of Preferred and Common Stockholders in 
Surplus Profits, 19 MICH. L. REV. 463, 464 (1921) (“The implied contract of equality of 
shares in the simple corporate situation with its one class of stock is now accepted as a mat-
ter of course . . . ”). 
312  This premise was accepted by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
225 (1988). See Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, 
Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1991). 
313  See Gillette, supra note 40, at 659. 
314  With respect to the levy of property taxes, see, e.g., FISHER, supra note 43, at 326–51. 
315  This assumption can be rebutted, because often, groups that are harmed by local actions 
are ones that are powerless over city hall, and can hardly influence local officials. Local 
spending on these groups will then be disproportionately lower. Nonetheless, for conven-
ience purposes, we assume even distribution of local spending on all residents. 
316  The loss is eight dollars rather than ten dollars, because we assume the benefits from the 
illegal assessment are evenly distributed among all residents. Thus, residents from the 20 
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locality pays back the one million dollars to the Group members. Since the 
payment comes out of the local treasury, it is financed by all local residents—
including the Group (that comprises 20 percent of the locality). The Group then 
gains $800,000 from the taxpayer suit (one million dollars minus $200,000), 
that is exactly what it lost from the excess tax. Even if the Group pays 20–30 
percent of this amount to attorneys, the initiation of the suit is still efficient and 
contributes to social justice in the locality. It enables injured groups in the lo-
cality to receive remedy from other groups for harms inflicted on them. 
This is certainly true if we assume that the harmed group (the Group in the 
example above) is often comprised of the weaker residents in the locality. The-
se residents are not connected to the local power bases (and hence are more 
vulnerable), and cannot influence city council members or city officials to cor-
rect the wrongful act. They also have difficulties taking legal action inde-
pendently, because, as an unorganized group, they suffer from collective action 
problems and, as individuals, they do not have the incentives or the required 
resources to litigate. Incentivizing lawyers to initiate legal action can help solve 
this problem. Lawyers will undoubtedly take their cut from the plaintiffs’ gains, 
but it will also propel these efficient and just wealth transfers. If the legal sys-
tem properly incentivizes lawyers, they will be able to monitor the local gov-
ernment and represent vulnerable residents who are unable to stand their own. 
Moreover, as John Coffee points out with regard to securities class action 
suits, the circularity of the class action is broken when the damages are not paid 
only by the corporation. When a third party pays at least part of the damages, 
wealth is transferred from the third party to the plaintiffs rather than (or at least 
not only) from the shareholders to themselves.317 Taxpayer suits, in their deriv-
ative form, allow exactly that. These suits allow taxpayers to sue third parties 
on behalf of the municipality, when the municipality fails to take action. Ena-
bling taxpayer suits in a derivative form is a good way for the local residents to 
recoup payments or subsidies the local government illegally gave to interest 
groups, thereby enriching the locality as a whole (rather than merely transfer-
ring wealth among different residents). It can also deter third parties (for exam-
ple, local officials) from conduct that is corrupt or ridden with conflict of inter-
ests, since the officials can be personally liable for such conduct. These 
payments are by no means a futile self-transfer, as they can improve local mon-
itoring ex-ante and enrich the local treasury ex-post. 
D. Suggested Reforms 
If we accept the premise that taxpayer suits can benefit taxpayers and local 
governments, we need to make several reforms to encourage potential plain-
tiffs. The reforms should change the way courts review taxpayer suits and in-
                                                                                                                                 
percent Group paid ten dollars in excess, but still enjoyed 20 percent of the benefit from the 
payment, i.e., they lost eight dollars. 
317  Coffee, supra note 302, at 1558. 
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centivize lawyers to monitor local governments and initiate the filing of tax-
payer suits when appropriate. The analysis in this paper suggests several re-
forms may be in order. 
First, as we have seen, many states place statutory or judicial limitations on 
taxpayer suits. The legislature or courts limit the available remedies (sometimes 
only injunctive or declaratory reliefs are permitted), or require plaintiffs to meet 
certain conditions to achieve standing.318 In order to encourage the use of tax-
payer actions, we believe such limitations should be removed. States should 
enable taxpayers to receive all types of remedies, and should not demand that 
taxpayer-plaintiffs prove any particular damage. On the contrary: taxpayers’ 
access to courts should be liberally construed, because the shortage of infor-
mation available to plaintiffs renders the filing of a taxpayer suit difficult as is 
(even without the additional legal requirements posed by the courts). Indeed, if 
we believe that the current level of monitoring is insufficient—and to the extent 
we agree that taxpayer suits can contribute to the monitoring efforts—why dis-
courage potential plaintiffs? 
In addition, and perhaps even more importantly, courts should award attor-
ney’s fees to winning plaintiffs. In most states, such fees are awarded, if at all, 
only when a common fund is created, and not when a non-pecuniary remedy is 
conferred.319 This, naturally, discourages potential plaintiffs, and as a result, 
taxpayer suits are initiated solely by few plaintiffs willing to bear the costs 
themselves. If we wish to encourage taxpayer suits, courts should award attor-
ney’s fees much more often. They should mandate payment to winning attor-
neys (or reimburse winning plaintiffs), so that they will not come out at a loss. 
The fees will motivate lawyers to search for and litigate winning cases, and the 
private enforcement will drive better local governance. 
Clearly, at least in the non-pecuniary cases (where no common fund is cre-
ated), the attorney’s fees will come out of the local treasury (taxpayer money). 
This is justified, however, because even when a given taxpayer litigation con-
cerns only a certain sector of the public, the public as a whole benefits from the 
taxpayer suit procedure. An efficient taxpayer suit mechanism ex-ante disci-
plines local officials, improves the decision-making process, and decreases cor-
ruption.320 These consequences improve the local administration, benefitting 
the local public as a whole. The public should therefore share the costs of this 
“private attorney general” mechanism, especially since these costs are incurred 
only when the claim is successful. A successful claim means the municipality 
had done something wrong, and the monitoring was proven just. 
Yet a third reform concerns the type of judicial review. Currently, many of 
the courts are apprehensive about second-guessing local officials’ decisions or 
replacing their discretion. As a result, they shy away from conducting judicial 
                                                        
318  See supra text accompanying notes 217–233. 
319  See supra text accompanying notes 244–264. 
320  See supra Section II.B. 
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review almost completely and refrain from passing judgment even when local 
officials have been negligent.321 We, on the other hand, advocate for a corpo-
rate-like standard of judicial review that does not question the wisdom of the 
decisions taken, but rather reviews the decision-making process.322 
Corporate courts, especially in Delaware, are extremely careful not to re-
place boards of directors’ discretion with that of their own. They trust the cor-
porate officers’ business judgment, and will not intervene in their decisions 
even if, in hindsight, the court believes the decision was wrong.323 However, 
corporate courts do examine the procedures through which corporate decisions 
are made.324 They require corporate officers to make informed decisions and to 
act in good faith. This approach was explained in the Caremark case: 
Whether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision 
substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through “stupid” to “egre-
gious” or “irrational”, provides no ground for director liability, so long as the 
court determines that the process employed was either rational or employed in a 
good faith effort to advance corporate interests.325 
This is the type of judicial review we believe courts should adopt in tax-
payer actions as well.326 Rather than judging local decisions on their merits, 
courts should examine the decisions’ legality and the decision-making process. 
If taxpayers prove that a decision was taken without due consideration, when 
local officials were insufficiently informed, and certainly when a decision was 
illegal, we see no reason why the court should not intervene. On the other hand, 
if the local officials made an informed decision in good faith, courts should up-
hold the decision even if, in hindsight, they believe it to be wrong. This stand-
ard respects the local officials’ discretion, but it still makes sure local actions 
conform to proper legal and procedural standards. For example, in the Warr 
Acres case,327 if a locality decides to spend a significant amount of money in 
order to attract a large corporation into the city, although the court should not 
second guess the policy behind the decision, it should examine the procedure 
that led to it. If the local officials decided on the expenditure with no factual 
data, no expert opinions, and without profound deliberation, (certainly when 
the decision is illegal or there is a conflict of interests) the decision should be 
overruled. If, on the other hand, the process employed by the local officials was 
proper, the court should uphold the expenditure even when it disagrees with the 
                                                        
321  See, e.g., supra notes 230–32. 
322  Schanzenbach & Shoked, supra note 18, at 1. 
323  Stout, supra note 32, at 675; Kastler, supra note 32, at 1902–03. 
324  Douglas M. Branson, Intracorporate Process and the Avoidance of Director Liability, 24 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 97 (1989); Thomas C. Wagner, Note, Corporate Law—The Busi-
ness Judgment Rule Imposes Procedural Requirements on Corporate Directors—Smith v. 
Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 110 (1986). 
325  In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (emphasis 
added). 
326  Lawrence, supra note 129, at 22. 
327  State ex rel. Brown v. City of Warr Acres, 946 P.2d 1140, 1140 (Okla. 1997). 
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underlying policy. We believe courts do not overstep their authority when in-
sisting on a correct procedure, and that local residents deserve an orderly and 
thoughtful decision-making process. If this is the standard we demand from 
those who manage our commercial corporations, we should expect no less of 
those making decisions that concern the public at large. 
 It may be argued that adopting such a standard with respect to local gov-
ernments will deter quality residents from serving as city officials. Residents 
may become fearful of personal liability and prefer not to get involved in public 
affairs (at least as council members), certainly when the monetary compensa-
tion they receive (as opposed to corporate boards) does not justify the potential 
risk. Although we understand the concern, we believe it does not justify main-
taining the low level of judicial review currently applied in taxpayer suits. First, 
our proposed standard of judicial review is not very high either. All city offi-
cials need to do in order to successfully meet the standard is to make informed 
deliberated decisions in good faith. Following this procedural requirement 
seems relatively easy, and if this minimum is not met, we think taxpayers are 
right to sue. Taxpayers, just like shareholders, may demand that their represent-
atives make decisions after verifying the facts and conducting proper delibera-
tions. Second, although the standard applies to the conduct of local officials 
(specifically their decision-making), the proposed standard does not require 
courts to impose personal liability on these officials. Courts can use alternative 
remedies, such as injunctions, mandamuses, or declaratory judgements, and 
impose pecuniary damages only on the local treasury328 or on third parties other 
than the local officials personally (for example, third parties who gained from 
an unlawful subsidy). Imposing pecuniary damages on local officials, in our 
opinion, should be reserved to cases where local officials behaved in bad faith, 
under a conflict of interests or with malice—negligence in itself should not suf-
fice. Third, if municipalities are apprehensive about courts imposing personal 
liability on their officials, they can always insure them or offer them indemnifi-
cation.329 Just like in the commercial sphere, the concerns of potential officials 
or council members can be alleviated, so as to attract good, yet risk-averse, of-
ficials to serve the public. 
CONCLUSION 
Local governments are complex entities. They provide an array of public 
goods and services to their residents, and they operate under various social, 
economic, and political constraints. Due to their complexity, efficient monitor-
ing of their operations is hard to attain. The residents—the equivalents of con-
sumers or shareholders—do not efficiently monitor local officials (because they 
are dispersed and unorganized); the creditors do not always have the interest or 
                                                        
328  As the example in Part C demonstrates, as long as the local action harms only a portion 
of the local public, payment by the local treasury is not circular and may be justified. 
329  The insurance or indemnification can be with a deductible paid personally by the official. 
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the tools to monitor, and the state’s supervision is often political in nature. Lo-
cal monitoring is under-provided, and this may enable local officials to behave 
self-interestedly to the detriment of the local public. The article argues that lo-
cal-taxpayer’ suits can serve as a tool to improve the local monitoring. In the 
article we looked at how this procedure is currently employed and analyzed 
whether and to what extent it should be reformed to increase local accountabil-
ity. 
Currently, despite some courts’ rhetoric about the importance of local-
taxpayer suits, the procedure is hardly used. In the article, we surveyed fourteen 
states that enacted a Taxpayers Statute (i.e. statutorily enabled a taxpayer suit 
procedure),330 and saw that in most of these states the Statute is by and large a 
dead letter. In the last twenty-six years taxpayers filed taxpayer suits just once 
or twice a year per state,331 and even when filed the suits were often rejected 
and the plaintiffs were not compensated. Courts were concerned about ‘separa-
tion of power’ considerations, and about flooding the courts with taxpayer liti-
gation, and so they narrowly interpreted the Taxpayer Statutes. They posed 
standing requirements and refused to award attorneys’ fees to winning plain-
tiffs, even when the plaintiffs conferred a benefit on the locality. 
The article made the claim that this attitude is wrong; we argued that local-
taxpayer suits can serve an important role in local monitoring by empowering 
local residents and disciplining local officials. Just like class or derivative ac-
tions do in the commercial sphere, taxpayer suits can create an “army” of pri-
vate attorneys general. If properly compensated, private attorneys would have a 
financial interest to monitor localities and to take action when they notice an 
illegality or a flaw in the local decision-making process. This would potentially 
render local officials to be more conscious of their actions, and incentivize 
them to adopt proper internal procedures. The costs of this private enforcement 
are relatively low. The lawyers, the propellants of the procedure, are compen-
sated only to the extent the litigation benefitted the locality, and the local (or 
state) treasury expends funds only when a locality has wronged. 
 To realize the potential of local-taxpayer suits, the article proposed several 
reforms. We suggested courts to interpret Taxpayer Statutes more broadly, to 
award attorney’s fees to winning plaintiffs and to adopt a corporate like stand-
ard of judicial review. Adopting these measures will incentivize plaintiffs and 
lawyers to bring more actions, thereby changing the way local governments are 
managed for the better. This should not diminish the role of the other potential 
monitors (like the state), but it can enhance the oversight on local officials. 
There is, of course, no guarantee that even if all the suggested reforms are 
adopted, taxpayer suits would be as prevalent as commercial class—or deriva-
tive actions—are, nor do we believe it is desirable. Implementing these reforms 
today may contribute to local monitoring, especially with regard to injuries in-
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331  See supra Section III.A. 
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flicted on weaker constituencies in the locality that have little political power. 
When localities experience financial difficulties, and in times of political insta-
bility, this can be a valuable step towards better, more efficient, local govern-
ance. 
